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1 About the training course 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: “Assessment of Reports on Major Hazards: A focus on the technical aspects of the assessment” 
 
Date and Place:  
The first training course was held on 13
th
- 14
th
 
October, 2016 at the JRC premises in Ispra, 
Italy. 
The agenda of the training is found in Annex 1.  
 
Material: 
Guidelines for the assessment of Reports on 
Major Hazards 
Presentations 
Case studies and group exercises 
Hand-outs 
 
Training providers: 
Mr. Steve Walker, former Head of the  UK HSE 
Offshore Division 
Ms. Myrto Konstantinidou, NCSR - Demokritos 
 
Sessions of the course: 
Introduction to Reports on Major Hazards 
Major Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment 
Equipment and Arrangements 
Emergency Response 
Assessment of Environmental Issues 
Safety and Environmental Management 
Systems 
Post Acceptance Issues 
 
 
Training goals: 
1. To introduce participants to the complexity of a Report on 
Major Hazards (RoMH), and to the technical, procedural, and 
administrative issues to be considered before and after 
formal acceptance; 
2. To train authorities on what to look in the RoMH and how to 
assess the RoMH from the technical point of view;  
3. To illustrate all the above in a series of practical and hands-on 
sessions, using case studies based on real RoMHs.   
4. To provide practical “tips” based on best practices of RoMH 
assessment;  
5. To allow exchange of views on the various approaches taken, 
difficulties encountered, lessons learned, and final 
conclusions drawn by the participants during the exercises. 
 
Audience: 
The members of the EU Offshore Authorities Group (EUOAG). 
All interested personnel responsible for assessing Reports on 
Major Hazards under Directive 2013/30/EU, in all MS Competent 
Authorities. 
 
Outcomes: 
The training course introduced Competent Authorities to the 
challenges of assessing a RoMH, and provided training on what to 
look for and how to perform the assessment from the technical 
point of view.  
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Abbreviations  
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
API American Petroleum Institute 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
BOP Blow Out Preventer 
CA Competent Authority 
CMAPP Corporate Major Accident Prevention Policy 
DG ENERGY The Directorate-General for Energy 
E&P Exploration & Production 
EER Emergency Evacuation and Response 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency 
ERP Emergency Response Plan 
ERRV Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel 
ESIA Environmental & Social Impact Assessment 
EUOAG European Union Offshore Authorities Group 
F&E Fire & Explosion 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
JRC Joint Research Centre 
FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading unit 
HAZID Hazard Identification study 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability study 
HSE UK Health Safety Executive UK 
HSEQ Health Safety Environment and Quality 
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IERP Internal Emergency Response Plan 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IPIECA International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
IT Information Technology 
LWC Loss of Well Control 
MH Major Hazard 
MS Member State (EU) 
MLD Master Logic Diagram 
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 
O&G UK Oil & Gas UK 
OGP (now IOGP) International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series 
OREDA Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data (project) 
OSD Offshore Safety Directive (Directive 2013/30/EU) 
OSRL Oil Spill Response Ltd. 
PHA Process Hazard Analysis 
PID Piping & Instrumentation Diagram 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
REMPEC Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea 
RoMH Report on Major Hazards 
RP Recommended Practice 
SECE Safety and Environmental Critical Element 
SEMS Safety and Environmental Management System 
SHIDAC Structured Hazard Identification and Control process 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft 
TR Temporary Refuge 
ViCOS Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety Expertise 
WOAD Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank 
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Definitions 
Blowout 
An uncontrolled flow of well fluids and/or formation fluids from the wellbore to surface or into 
lower pressured subsurface zones (underground blowout).  
Source: Guidance Document on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No1112/2014 of 13 
October 2014 (available at: 
http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/files/attachments/2015_11_25_implementing_regulation_guidanc
e_document_final.pdf ) 
Competent 
Authority 
Public authority, appointed pursuant Directive 2013/30/EU and responsible for the duties 
assigned to it in this Directive. The competent authority may be comprised of one or more public 
bodies [Article 2(14) Directive 2013/30/EU] 
Independent 
Verification 
An assessment and confirmation of the validity of particular written statements by an entity or an 
organisational part of the operator or the owner that is not under the control of or influenced by, 
the entity or the organisational part using those statements [Article 2(29) Directive 2013/30/EU] 
Installation 
A stationary, fixed or mobile facility, or a combination of facilities permanently inter-connected 
by bridges or other structures, used for offshore oil and gas operations or in connection with such 
operations. Installations include mobile offshore drilling units only when they are stationed in 
offshore waters for drilling, production or other activities associated with offshore oil and gas 
operations [Article 2(19) Directive 2013/30/EU] 
Oil Spill 
An oil spill is oil, discharged accidentally or intentionally, that floats on the surface of water 
bodies as a discrete mass and is carried by the wind, currents and tides. Oil spills can be partially 
controlled by chemical dispersion, combustion, mechanical containment and adsorption.  
Source: OECD glossary (https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1902) 
Operator 
Entity appointed by the licensee or licensing authority to conduct offshore oil and gas operations, 
including planning and executing a well operation or managing and controlling the functions of a 
production installation [Article 2(5) Directive 2013/30/EU] 
Owner 
‘owner’ means an entity legally entitled to control the operation of a non-production installation 
[Article 2(27) Directive 2013/30/EU] 
Loss of well 
control 
Uncontrolled flow of subterranean formation fluids such as gas, oil, water, etc. and/or well fluids 
into the environment or into a separate underground formation, in which case it is called an 
underground blowout. 
Source: API STD 65 – Part 2, Isolating Potential Flow Zones During Well Construction, Upstream 
Segment, Second Edition, December 2010. 
Other definitions at: http://www.iadclexicon.org/loss-of-well-control-lwc/  
Report on 
Major Hazards 
A document prepared by the operator or owner of an installation and submitted to the 
Competent Authority of the relevant Member State to demonstrate that all major accident 
hazards have been identified, and that suitable control measures have been put in place in order 
to reduce the risk of a major accident to an acceptable level. [Directive 2013/30/EU]  
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2 Introduction 
The blowout on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20th 2010, whilst drilling the Macondo well 
in the Gulf of Mexico, significantly raised worldwide awareness of the risks involved in offshore oil and gas 
operations.  In addition to the tragic loss of eleven lives, the blowout released nearly five million barrels of 
oil into the waters of the Gulf, and is considered to be the world’s largest accidental oil spill from offshore 
operations.   
In order to ensure a high level of safety in the European offshore oil and gas industry, the EU 
Parliament and the Council published Directive 2013/30/EU, amending Directive 2004/35, obliging national 
Competent Authorities to control safety aspects of the offshore oil and gas installations in their waters.  
One of the fundamental new requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU is the preparation and submission by 
owners and operators of a Report on Major Hazards (RoMH) for every offshore installation. The RoMH 
aims at providing evidence that the overall risks from the installation (both to operators and to the 
environment) have been reduced to an acceptable level.  
Offshore oil and gas operations can only be conducted by that installation if its RoMH has been 
assessed and accepted by the Competent Authority of the relevant Member State.  
A Competent Authority (CA) - appointed pursuant to Directive 2013/30/EU - should be legally 
empowered and capable of performing the assessment of the relevant RoMHs. In order to assist CAs to 
acquire these competencies, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) 
appointed the Joint Research Centre (JRC) for the development of a Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety 
Expertise (ViCOS).  
ViCOS is intended to be the meeting point for Competent Authorities, third-party offshore experts and 
other stakeholders. Among its various services, ViCOS is also a centralised training facility with workshops 
and training delivery programs for regulatory and technical experts. 
Discussions with Member States' representatives at the European Union Offshore Competent 
Authorities Group (EUOAG) have identified that Competent Authority training in the assessment of RoMHs 
and linked documentation is one of the main priorities, especially for those Member States who did not 
currently have a mature offshore industry in their waters.  
The present Guidelines for the Assessment of Reports on Major Hazards (as required by Directive 
2013/30/EU) have been prepared as a summary of the first training course organised under ViCOS, held at 
the premises of the JRC Ispra in October 2016. These guidelines are structured in the following sections: 
 A Framework for RoMH assessment; 
 Major Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment; 
 Safety & Environmental Management Systems (SEMS); 
 Equipment and Arrangements; 
 Emergency Response – Safety Aspects; 
 Emergency Response – Environmental Aspects; 
 Independent Verification; 
 Post Acceptance Issues. 
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3 Training providers and authors of the Guidelines 
Steve Walker - Author of the guidelines and main provider of the training course. 
Former Head of the UK HSE Offshore Division and former co-chair of the EUOAG. 
  
After obtaining a degree in Chemical Engineering and working in industry, Steve 
worked for the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) for 38 years.  During that time, 
Steve worked as a health & safety regulator in a wide number of operational posts 
(covering major hazard industries, such as chemical plants, the offshore industry, and 
railways), providing proactive inspections/audit, accident investigations and 
enforcement activity.  
After 5 years as an Operations Manager in HSE’s Offshore Division (OSD), he became Head of OSD from 
2009-2013, responsible for the Division which assessed and regulated the integrity and safety of the 
approximately 300 offshore oil & gas installations on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf.  Following an 
HSE re-organisation in April 2013, Steve became the Head of Strategic Intervention for the new Energy 
Division (ED). He had particular responsibilities for developing the UK/HSE implementation of the Offshore 
Safety Directive 2013/30/EU. 
From 2012-2014, Steve was the chair of the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF) and the 
inaugural co-chair of the European Union Offshore Authorities Group (EUOAG). 
Steve retired from HSE in April 2014 and undertakes ad-hoc consultancy work.  He is currently an Associate 
of HSL on infrastructure ageing and life extension, most recently within the nuclear chemicals industry.  He 
has undertaken independent expert work relating to offshore contractual litigation, and has worked on 
behalf of the European Commission and the US Chemical Safety Board on offshore oil & gas regulatory 
issues.  He has also advised the Constructing Better Health (CBH) organisation in relation to offshore 
occupational health matters.  
Steve was made a Chartered Fellow of IOSH in September 2014. 
 
Myrto Konstantinidou - Co-author of the guidelines and contributor to the training course. 
Research Scientist at Systems Reliability and Industrial Safety Laboratory - NCSR Demokritos. 
 
Myrto has more than 15 years’ experience in Quantified Risk Assessment of industrial 
installations and Accident analysis. Her main focus of research has been on the causes 
of Industrial Accidents in the Oil and Gas sector (including offshore) as well as on the 
integration of Human Factors in the risk assessment, safety management and 
investigation of major accidents. 
Her current position is in Systems Reliability and Industrial Safety Laboratory of the National Centre of 
Scientific Research in Greece where she is involved in developing methodologies for Quantified Risk 
Assessment in various sectors. She has provided scientific support to the European Directive 2013/30/EU 
on “Safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities” and participated to 
the development of the pilot version of the Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety Expertise. She has proven 
experience in the implementation of SEVESO Directive in Greece (including assessment of Major Hazards 
reports, safety audits and investigations). She is also familiar with regulatory practices in different EU 
countries for safety and environmental issues. She has participated in numerous European and national 
projects, coordination actions and networks for the improvement of industrial safety.
A Framework for RoMH Assessment 
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4 A Framework for RoMH Assessment 
 4.1 Types of RoMHs  
 4.2 What should a RoMH contain and cover? 
 4.3 Assessment and acceptance of RoMH by the CA 
4.1 Types of RoMHs 
 
A Report on Major Hazards (RoMH) is a document that shall be prepared by the operator or owner of 
an installation and submitted to the Competent Authority (CA) to demonstrate that all major accident 
hazards have been identified, and that adequate control measures have been put in place in order to 
reduce the risk of a major accident to an acceptable level [Articles 12 and 131].  
 
Directive 2013/30/EU (otherwise known as Offshore Safety Directive, OSD) anticipates two broad 
categories of RoMHs for offshore oil and gas installations: 
 Production Installation RoMHs, which include those for fixed installations (i.e. with foundations on 
the sea bed) and those for floating installations, such as FPSOs (Floating Production, Storage and 
Offloading); 
 Non-production Installations RoMHs, which include those for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(MODUs) and Flotels. 
 
 
Upon receipt of the RoMH, the Competent Authority must ensure that operations are not commenced 
until the RoMH is assessed and accepted: 
 The Directive requires that operations relating to Production and Non-Production Installations are 
not to commence until the RoMH has been accepted by the relevant Member State Competent 
Authority (CA) [Article 6(5)].  
                                                          
1
 All Articles mentioned in the present document refer to Directive 2013/30/EU. 
Article 12 (1) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
Member States shall ensure that the operator prepares a report on major hazards for a production 
installation, to be submitted pursuant to point (e) of Article 11(1). That report shall contain the 
information specified in Annex I, Parts 2 and 5 and shall be updated whenever appropriate or when so 
required by the competent authority. 
Article 13 (1) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
Member States shall ensure that the owner prepares a report on major hazards for a non-production 
installation, to be submitted pursuant to point (e) of Article 11(1). That report shall contain the 
information specified in Annex I, Parts 3 and 5 and shall be updated whenever appropriate or when so 
required by the competent authority.  
 
Articles 2 (16), (20) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
A production installation is an installation used for production, i.e. offshore extraction of oil and gas 
from the underground strata of the licensed area, including offshore processing of oil and gas and its 
conveyance through connected infrastructure. 
Article 2(17) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
A non-production installation is an installation other than an installation used for production of oil and 
gas. 
Example. Entities responsible for the submission of RoMHs: 
 In the case of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, the relevant RoMH would have been provided by 
Transocean (as the drilling contractor - owner or the rig), rather than the operator BP.  
Key Message: 
“No accepted RoMH – No 
commencement of operations” 
A Framework for RoMH Assessment 
7 
 
Note. No exemptions for a short-term activity are allowed by the OSD: even one-day operations of 
an installation require the formal acceptance of a RoMH.  
 Where material changes to the installations are subsequently made, changes should not be brought 
into use or operations commenced until the CA has accepted the amended RoMH [Articles 12(6), 
13(6)];  
 Where the dismantlement of a fixed production installation is proposed, any dismantling should 
not commence until the CA has accepted the amended RoMH [Article 12(6)]. 
 
 
There are a number of related notifications which also have to be submitted to the CA during the life cycle 
of a particular offshore installation.  These notifications are strongly linked to the relevant RoMHs for the 
installation considered, i.e.: 
 A design notification [Article 11(3)] for a planned production installation is required to be 
submitted prior to the submission of the initial RoMH, by a deadline set by the CA. The CA is 
required to “respond” to such a notification, with comments which should be taken into account 
within the subsequent RoMH for the production installation. 
 
 
 A relocation notification [Article 11(5)] is required when an existing production installation is to be 
moved to a new production location. The deadline for such a notification is set by the CA who, once 
again, is required to “respond”. The CA comments have to be taken into account within the 
subsequent RoMH for the production installation at the new location. 
 
 
 
 
Article 12 (6) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
Member States shall ensure that the planned modifications are not brought into use nor any 
dismantlement commenced until the competent authority has accepted the amended report on 
major hazards for the production installation. 
Article 13 (6) - Directive 2013/30/EU 
For a mobile non-production installation, Member States shall ensure that the planned 
modifications are not brought into use until the competent authority has accepted the amended 
report on major hazards for the mobile non-production installation.  
Example. A design notification is required at a very early stage in the installation’s lifecycle, i.e. 
before a planned production installation is about to be constructed and subsequently put into 
operation for the first time in MS waters. The MS CA should be notified of the installation’s basic 
design details in advance, and should respond with some comments. The operator is not obliged to 
accept CA comments, but must be able to explain how those comments would be taken into 
account in the subsequent RoMH. 
Article 11 (5) 
The relocation notification required pursuant to point (j) of paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the 
competent authority at a stage that is sufficiently early in the proposed development to enable the 
operator to take into account any matters raised by the competent authority during the 
preparation of the report on major hazards. 
 
Article 11 (1) 
(j) in the case of an existing production installation which is to be moved to a new production 
location where it is to be operated, a relocation notification in accordance with Annex I, Part 1. 
Example.  A relocation notification is required when an FPSO is going to be moved to a new field 
within MS waters. 
A Framework for RoMH Assessment 
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Note. A relocation notification is only applicable to floating production installations. A design 
notification is applicable to fixed and floating production installations that will be constructed and 
eventually put into operation for the first time. 
 
 A Well Operations Notification [Article 15] is required to be submitted to a deadline set by the CA 
when a well operation is to be carried out.  The CA is required to “consider” this notification and 
take appropriate action “if necessary”. 
In particular, a Well Operations Notification shall be submitted to the CA together with or after the 
submission of the relevant RoMH, and prior to the commencement of well operations.  
 
 
More details about Well Operations Notifications are given in Chapter 11 (Post Acceptance Issues). 
 
 A Combined Operation Notification [Article 16] is required to be submitted to a deadline set by the 
CA when a combined operation involving two or more installations is to be carried out.  Similarly to 
the notification for well operations, the CA must “consider” it, and take appropriate action “if 
necessary”. 
 
 
 
 A Notification of Entering or Leaving a Member State’s Waters [Article 11(4)], is required when an 
existing production installation is due to enter or leave the waters of a Member State. The relevant 
CA should be notified prior to that date, though just for informational purposes. There is no 
requirement for the CA to respond to such a notification. 
Article 15 (1) 
Member States shall ensure that the operator of a well prepares the notification to be submitted 
pursuant to point (h) of Article 11(1) to the competent authority. It shall be submitted by a 
deadline set by the competent authority that is before the commencement of the well operation. 
That notification of well operations shall contain details of the design of the well and the proposed 
well operations in accordance with Annex I, Part 4. This shall include an analysis of the oil spill 
response effectiveness. 
Example #1.  Well operations notifications will inevitably be required when a drilling rig (e.g. 
MODU) is going to operate in Member States' waters. In that case, a RoMH for a non-production 
installation will first be needed. If the MODU already operates in MS waters with an accepted 
RoMH and is going to be moved to a new field within the same MS waters, then a new RoMH for 
the above-mentioned rig is not required but new well operations notifications will be required for 
the work at the new location. The well operator is responsible for the preparation and submission 
of well operations notifications. 
Example #2. A well operations notification is required before any entry to an existing (operational) 
well that can lead to the release of hydrocarbons and potential major hazard.   
 
Article 16 (1) 
Member States shall ensure that operators and owners involved in a combined operation jointly 
prepare the notification to be submitted pursuant to point (i) of Article 11(1). The notification shall 
contain the information specified in Annex I, Part 7. Member States shall ensure that one of the 
operators concerned submits the notification of combined operations to the competent authority. 
The notification shall be submitted by a deadline set by the competent authority before combined 
operations are commenced.  
Example.  A combined operations notification shall be submitted to the CA when a mobile drilling 
unit comes alongside a fixed production platform in order to re-enter the well, or when any other 
installation, such as a flotel, is going to perform a joint operation with another installation. 
A Framework for RoMH Assessment 
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More information on other relevant documentation is found in Chapter 11 (Post Acceptance 
Issues). 
However, to add to this complexity of submissions and notifications, Member States’ CAs (depending 
on their own scope of activities) may also be involved with responsibilities for offshore installations 
(including formal submissions and notifications) under other linked EU Directives.  These include:  
 offshore licensing and authorisation under Directive 94/22/EC; 
 issues of relating to environmental liability under Directive 2004/35/EC and its amending 
Directive 2014/52/EU;  
 safety of workers under Directive 92/91/EEC. 
The involvement of competent authorities during the life cycle of offshore installations is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 1 Life Cycle of Competent Authority involvement with RoMHs and offshore notifications 
 
Article 11 (4) 
Where an existing production installation is to enter, or leave the offshore waters of a Member 
State, the operator shall notify the competent authority in writing prior to the date on which the 
production installation is due to enter or leave the offshore waters of the Member State.  
Example. When an FPSO starts its preparation to enter MS waters, the competent authority of that 
MS should receive a written notification to this purpose. 
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4.2 What should a RoMH contain and cover? 
The RoMH requirements within the Directive are sometimes confusing and complex. Particular 
attention should be given to the Directive’s definition of “major accident” [Article 2(1)]. The scope of the 
Directive (and thus of the RoMHs) is to focus on the regulation of those events with the potential for 
multiple fatalities and/or for significant environmental damage. 
  
 
Although the Directive makes a distinction between RoMHs for Production and for Non-Production 
installations, these two types of RoMHs follow the same pattern of requirements, with both types of 
RoMHs required to contain information in four broad categories, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4 2 Contents of a Report on Major Hazards 
Within these four broad categories – which can be thought of as “Chapters” – RoMHs are required to 
contain the following: 
A. General Information; 
B. Major Hazard identification and assessment; 
C. Description of Control Measures; 
D. Specified Items. 
The specific content of each of the aforementioned categories is detailed below. 
A. General Information 
 
 Name and address of operator or owner; 
 Maximum number of persons on installation; 
 Description of the installation, including any connected infrastructure; 
 For mobile non-production installations, description of means of transfer and stationing; 
Article 2 – Definition of "Major Accident" 
A ‘major accident’ means, in relation to an installation or connected infrastructure: 
a) an incident involving an explosion, fire, loss of well control, or release of oil, gas or dangerous 
substances involving, or with a significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal injury; 
b) an incident leading to serious damage to the installation or connected infrastructure involving, or 
with a significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal injury; 
c) any other incident leading to fatalities or serious injury to five or more persons who are on the 
offshore installation where the source of danger occurs or who are engaged in an offshore oil and 
gas operation in connection with the installation or connected infrastructure; or 
d) any major environmental incident resulting from incidents referred to in points (a), (b) and (c). 
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 Summary of workers' involvement in the preparation of the RoMH; 
 Relevant codes, standards and guidance used in construction and commissioning. 
 
B.   Major Hazard identification and assessment 
 
 Demonstration that all Major Hazards (MHs) have been identified; 
 Demonstration that the MH likelihood and consequences have been assessed; 
 Description of types of operations with that MH potential; 
 Demonstration that the control measures – including Safety and Environmental Critical 
Elements (SECEs) – are suitable to reduce risks to an acceptable level.  This also includes an 
assessment of oil spill response effectiveness. 
 
C.     Description of control measures 
 
 Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure:  
 Well control; 
 Process Safety and prevention of fire/explosion; 
 Containment of, and worker protection from, hazardous substances; 
 Protection of environment from major accidents; 
 Description of arrangements to protect persons, including:  
 Escape, evacuation and rescue; 
 Maintenance of control systems if everyone is evacuated; 
 Adequate description of the relevant Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS). 
 
D.    Specified items 
 
 Description of the Independent Verification Scheme; 
 Description of the Internal Emergency Response Plan; 
 Information relevant to other specified Directives, including: 
 Directive 92/91/EEC  (safety and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting 
industries through drilling); 
 Directive 2011/92/EU  (assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment); 
 Assessment of environmental effects from loss of containment, including a description of the 
technical and non-technical measures envisaged to prevent, reduce or offset those effects, 
including monitoring. 
 
4.3 Assessment and acceptance of RoMH by the CA 
Competent Authorities have the crucial function of assessing and accepting RoMHs. According to the 
OSD [Article 2(22)], by accepting a RoMH, the CA confirms that the document meets the requirements of 
the Directive.  
 
 
 
 This will be a high-profile activity for the CA, with the potential for significant external pressure from 
the owner/operator to accept the RoMH as soon as possible and - if possible - without major changes, with 
Article 2 (22) 
‘acceptance’, in   relation   to   the   report   on   major   hazards, means   the   communication   in   
writing   by   the   competent   authority to the operator or the owner that the report, if 
implemented as set out therein, meets the requirements of this Directive.  Acceptance does not 
imply any transfer of responsibility for control of major hazards to the competent authority. 
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diverse views from public pressure groups either to reject the RoMH (e.g. from environmental groups) or to 
accept it (e.g. from industry and employee bodies), and possibly conflicting views within the respective 
Government Ministries. 
Guidance on the aspects that CAs should look at when performing a “thorough assessment” are listed 
in the Directive’s Annex III (2) (3), and this should form a key part of the formal assessment procedures for 
any CA.  In summary, Annex III (2)(3) requires that - when assessing a RoMH - the CA ensures that: 
 All required factual information is provided; 
 All reasonably foreseeable major accident hazards and their initiating events are identified 
(with clear methodology); 
 Risk management takes into account the life cycle of the installation; 
 It is clear how the proposed measures reduce risk to an acceptable level; 
 Whether good practise, sound engineering principles, human and organisational factors have 
been taken into account; 
 Response to emergencies: 
 arrangements to detect and rapidly respond are clearly identified and justified; 
 arrangements for escape, evacuation and rescue are integrated and systematic; 
 requirements are incorporated into the internal emergency response plans; 
 The independent verification scheme is clearly explained; 
 The Safety & Environmental Management System (SEMS) is adequate, including auditing and 
implementation of audit recommendations. 
The way any CA organises itself to assess and accept RoMHs will depend upon a number of factors, i.e.: 
 whether the CA is a single or joint authority;  
 the scope and style of the MS’s implementing legislation; 
 the involvement of any non-CA specialists within the assessment team; 
 the involvement of the CA in any licensing or economic development activities. 
However, Directive 2013/30/EU requires CAs to establish transparent policies, processes and 
procedures for assessing RoMHs. Unfortunately, the specific requirements of the Directive do not lend 
themselves to the creation of a standard layout for a RoMH, and this has implications when CAs decide on 
the process they need to adopt to undertake a rigorous RoMH assessment.   
Some practical advice for CAs when undertaking RoMH assessment, based on experience, is the 
following: 
 Operator responsibility: the onus is on the operator or owner to convince the CA that their 
RoMH is suitable, not the other way around.  
 Iterative process: expect an iterative process, with requests from the CA for more data, clearer 
explanations etc.  Some common, generic issues from RoMH assessment are described in 
more detail in SEMS section. 
 Correlation with the Directive: RoMHs can be long, detailed and complex documents, and not 
written with the framework of the Directive in mind. With this is mind, it can be very time 
consuming for the CA to have to search for where specific requirements of the Directive are 
covered, so get operator/owner to identify which part of RoMH covers which requirement 
from the Directive.  
 Check list: upon receipt of a RoMH for the first time it is important to have an initial scrutiny 
process to check that all the necessary information is in the RoMH, and send it back if 
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SUGGESTIONS 
Use project management principles: 
 Clear project leadership and governance 
 Team “design” and roles 
 Resources management 
 IT issues – including templates & control of 
documentation 
 Agreed, documented processes (especially 
important when more than one body is involved) 
 Clear allocation of work to project team members 
 Clear decision making and recording procedures 
 Consistent communication arrangements between 
CA and owner/operator 
 Peer review, disputes and appeal arrangements 
something is missed. A checklist on the content of a Report on Major Hazards, which can be 
used for such initial completeness scrutiny, is proposed in Annex 2. 
 Paper version: consider the benefits of paper rather than electronic versions of some parts of 
the RoMH, such as process flow diagrams and PIDs. 
 Prior items: it will not be necessary to 
consider every item within a RoMH to the 
same level.  Some issues will require 
assessment at a greater depth than others. 
 Project management principles: use 
project management principles, with clear 
project leadership and governance, 
adequate attention to team “design”, roles 
and resources, and clear decision making 
and recording procedures. 
 Agreed and documented processes are 
important when more than one body is 
involved within the CA assessment team.  
As part of these, consider the IT 
requirements at an early stage, including design of templates & control of documentation. 
 Action tracking: establish good progress monitoring, progress and actions tracking with the 
assessment depends on the slowest member of the team.  
 Early discussion: have early internal discussions within the team to establish consistency of 
assessment approaches and decision making. 
 Collaboration with Operator: establish good and consistent communication between CA and 
owner/operator. Regular face-to-face progress meetings with external parties can avoid 
“death by email”, and make CA arrangements very clear to distinguish asking for more 
information to clarify issues from raising matters of significant concern which could, if not 
addressed, jeopardise acceptance. 
 Transparency: remember that the whole RoMH assessment/acceptance process will be 
undertaken within expectations of transparency of decision making.  Therefore, CAs must 
ensure that they have adequate (and documented) disputes resolution processes, peer review 
arrangements, and appeal procedures as part of their overall RoMH assessment process. 
 
 
Key Message: 
The engagement with the operator or owner at the early stage of RoMH lifecycle is an important 
aspect, and CAs are encouraged to: 
1.  Meet with the operator/owner prior to the RoMH submission, in order to clearly 
explain what is expected from the RoMH;  
2. After submission of the RoMH, ask operators/owners to demonstrate where each 
section of the Directive requirements is situated inside the RoMH; 
3. Look through the RoMH to analyse whether each section (e.g. SEMS, Environment, 
Equipment) requires additional expertise or not. 
 
Key Message: 
The CA should keep the right balance between cooperation and independence/objectivity 
towards the operator/owner while assessing a RoMH.  
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Approach to RoMH assessment 
In assessing many of the Directive’s specific RoMH requirements, CAs have the option of adopting a 
“vertical slice” or a “horizontal slice” assessment approach.  In a vertical slice approach, each of the various 
specific RoMH requirements (SEMS, Risk Assessment, Verification, Emergency Response etc.) are 
individually assessed in their totality.  
For instance, when assessing the SEMS, the relevant assessment team member would look at both the 
overall structure of the SEMS, and also the adequacy of how each of its components - competency, 
supervision, auditing etc. - are applied across the installation’s activities.  In a horizontal approach, though, 
assessment team members would instead look across each of the specific RoMH requirements from a 
particular topic specialist perspective.  Thus, one assessor would have a “well control” remit, and would 
look at the adequacy of how all the common requirements – SEMS, Risk Assessment, Emergency Response, 
etc. – apply to well control matters. Other assessment team members would adopt a similar approach, 
each with having specific remits for, say, Fire & Explosion, Control & Instrumentation, Environmental 
Protection etc.     
The assessment approach which each CA adopts will need to reflect the size and competencies of their 
particular CA assessment resource.  Actually, a mixture of both the vertical and horizontal slice approaches 
is often preferable – using the SEMS requirements as an example, one assessor could have the role of 
assessing the suitability of the overall SEMS structure, policies, and arrangements. If the overall SEMS was 
considered adequate, other assessors could then provide additional assurance by looking how that overall 
SEMS structure is implemented within particular specialist topics – e.g. competency arrangements for Well 
Control/Drilling, verification with respect to Fire & Explosion control, and monitoring within the 
Environmental Protection field.  Figure 3 below gives a schematic for a possible Competent Authority RoMH 
assessment/acceptance process.  In this case, a vertical slice approach has been adopted, but the scheme 
can simply be amended to a horizontal slice approach, or even a mixture of the two. 
 
 
Figure 4 3 RoMH assessment and acceptance approach by CAs 
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Exercise: 
A. You have just received a RoMH for a mobile drilling rig to come into your waters to drill a series of 
exploratory wells. Please, identify and list (a) four external pressures and (b) four internal pressures 
on you as a competent authority in assessing and accepting the RoMH. 
B. Consider what you, as competent authorities, need to do to address each of those pressures. 
Exercise Conclusion: 
Typical external pressures: 
 From the installation operator/owner to accept the RoMH (or associated notifications) as soon 
as possible, and without major changes; 
 Possible similar pressure to accept RoMH quickly from Energy or Revenue Ministers; 
 Pressure from Environmental/Safety Ministers to do an exemplary job; 
 Public will be vocal, with environmental interests demanding CAs not to accept (and challenging 
if they do), but others urging acceptance. 
How to address external pressures: 
 Communication with all stakeholders, looking for mutual agreements; 
 Transparent approach: sharing of procedures, engagement into discussion, etc. 
 Set up clear expectations for RoMH contents with the operator/owner. 
 
Typical internal pressures: 
 Considerable detailed documentation to consider; 
 RoMH assessment process can be complex to manage; 
 Time pressure to get assessment completed; 
 Lack of experience within the CA; 
 Having to deal with industry “offshore specialists” 
 “Acceptance” is different from usual regulation activities; 
 Expectations that work can be done by those with existing responsibilities; 
 Lack of available resources – especially technical expertise; 
 High profile work because of political, press and pressure group interest. 
How to address internal pressures: 
 Take all the time needed to make a thorough assessment, however fix the necessary deadlines; 
 Set up clear internal guidelines, including: procedures, timeframes, additional expertise needed, 
etc.  
 Consider a visual inspection of the installation in addition to the assessment of the RoMH 
documentation.  
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5 Major Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment  
 5.1 Risk evaluation methodology 
 5.2 Case Study 
 
In any major hazard industry, if the identification of the key major hazard risks is flawed, and the 
assessment of those risks inconsistent, then subsequent decisions on the adequacy of control measures 
and other safety and environmental arrangements will inevitably be inadequate.  Therefore, the Major 
Hazard identification and risk assessment processes within any offshore RoMH is of crucial importance, and 
the requirements in Annex I of Directive 2013/30/EU reflect this, i.e. by requiring RoMHs (for both 
Production and Non-Production installations) to contain: 
 A demonstration that all the major hazards have been identified, their likelihood and consequences 
assessed, including any environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations on safe operations, 
and that their control measures including associated safety and environmental critical elements are 
suitable so as to reduce the risk of a major accident to an acceptable level [Parts 2(5) and 3(5)]; 
 any other relevant details, for example where two or more installations operate in combination in a 
way which affects the major hazard potential of either or all installations [Parts 2(13) and 3(14)]; 
In addition: 
 Production installation RoMHs should include “a description of the types of operations with major 
hazard potential to be carried out […]” [Part 2(6)]; 
 Non-Production installations RoMHs should include a “demonstration that all the major hazards 
have been identified for all operations the installation is capable of performing, and that the risk of 
a major accident is reduced to an acceptable level [Part 3(9)].”  
According to the above requirements during the assessment of RoMHs a CA has to ensure that: 
 All required factual information is provided by the operator or owner;  
 All reasonably foreseeable major accident hazards and their initiating events are identified through 
a clear methodology risk management process takes into account the whole life cycle of the 
installation having anticipated all foreseeable situations including:  
 the design decisions in the design notification to ensure inherent safety and environmental 
principles; 
 well operations to be conducted from the installation when operating;  
 well operations to be undertaken and temporarily suspended before production is 
commenced; 
 combined operations to be undertaken with other installation;  
 how the decommissioning of the installation will be undertaken; 
 A justification on how the proposed/taken measures reduce the risk of the installation to an 
acceptable level; 
 Whether good practise, sound engineering practise and human and organisational factors have 
been taken into account during the whole process. 
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5.1 Risk evaluation methodology 
The typical steps to be followed in an overall risk evaluation methodology are depicted in Figure 5.1. 
These include hazard identification and the subsequent accident sequence analysis, which is fundamental 
for proper frequency assessment and the consequence estimation. 
All of these steps are required to calculate risk as a function of the probability of occurrence of an 
event and its associated potential consequences.  Risk is usually represented by use of risk matrices or iso-
risk curves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 1 Main steps in risk evaluation methodology 
Directive 2013/30/EU does not prescribe any specific risk identification/assessment methodology to be 
used in the RoMH.  
For Production installations, ISO Standard 177762 provides some offshore industry specific guidelines.  
For Non-Production installations, some guidance can be found in the International Association of Drilling 
Contractors’ Health, Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (the 
“IADC HSE Guidelines”).   
In general, the approaches adopted by the Industry and the Regulators commonly follow a four-
pronged approach, to reply to the following questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 ISO 17776 “Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production installations -- Guidelines on tools and techniques for 
hazard identification and risk assessment” 
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1) Hazard Identification 
Within the Hazard Identification process, the main sources of potential hazards and substance releases 
are identified and the initiating events that can cause such releases are determined.  Common methods for 
Hazard Identification include the following: 
 HAZIDs – HAZard IDentification studies, a well know systematic approach to identifying 
hazards within process industries; 
 HAZOPs – HAZard and OPerability analysis, a more detailed review technique; 
 PHA - Process Hazard Analysis, another systematic approach; 
 What-If Analysis; 
 FMEAs – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis; 
 MLDs - Master Logic Diagrams, an approach for initiating event identification; 
 Safety Reviews; 
 SHIDAC - Structured Hazard Identification and Control process;  
 Using industry standards and checklists; 
 Fire & Explosion studies. 
 
All foreseeable hazards should be identified in the RoMH including the whole life cycle of the 
installation. Therefore it is suggested that: 
 Hazard identification takes into account all operational phases and critical areas of the installation; 
 Hazard identification takes into account adjacent installations; 
 Hazard identification takes into account domino effects. 
2) Accident Sequence Analysis and Frequency Assessment 
At this stage, a logic model for the installation is developed. The model has to include each and every 
initiator of potential accidents, as identified at the previous step (hazard identification) and the response of 
the installation to such initiators.  
In this way, specific accident sequences are defined: they consist of an initiating event, specific system 
failures or successes (which can be either technical or procedural), and potential human responses.  
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 Both prevention and mitigation measures should be included in the accident sequences. Bow-tie diagrams 
(Figure 5.2) can be used in this step. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 2. A typical Bow-tie diagram 
The Bow-tie methodology is a commonly used approach to present accident sequences, thus facilitating 
Frequency Assessment.  
Other approaches, such as the Event Tree Analysis and the Fault Tree Analysis are also widely used to 
provide logic models to calculate event frequencies.  System failures are modelled in terms of basic 
component failures and potential human errors to identify their basic causes and to allow for the 
quantification of the system failure probabilities and accident sequence frequencies.   
The most commonly used data sources (for the offshore industry) include the SINTEF Offshore Blowout 
database3, the OREDA Handbook4 and the IOGP Risk Assessment Data Directory. 
3) Consequences estimation 
Consequence Estimation is performed after the frequency assessment, in order to model the effects 
of the ranges of releases, blast pressures, etc.   
                                                          
3 https://www.sintef.no/en/projects/sintef-offshore-blowout-database/  
4 https://www.oreda.com/  
Bow-ties  
Bow-ties are diagrams depicting in a single graph both causes and consequences of a central event. 
They consist of a Left Hand Side (LHS) which usually represents the prevention measures and a 
Right Hand Side (RHS) which displays protection and mitigation measures. 
The Top Event (TE) may be an accident or, in general, an undesired event.  
Major Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
20 
 
The main phenomena which should be modelled in the RoMH for both production and non-production 
installations include oil and gas releases which may in turn lead to: 
 Hazardous substances dispersions (i.e. concentration calculations) 
 Fires (heat radiation) 
 Explosions (overpressure). 
These phenomena can be modelled and their consequences estimated with various models as the Directive 
does not impose any specific model or methodology. 
According to ISO 17776, the consequences on: 
 People (P); 
 Environment (E); 
 Assets (A); 
 Reputation of the company (R); 
should all be estimated. 
Consequences can be immediate or delayed, and damages can be either temporary or permanent. 
4) Risk evaluation 
Once the consequences of an event are also estimated, risk can be assessed as the combination of 
probability and consequences.  
 
 
 
 
Risk Assessment may be performed in various ways: 
 qualitatively (usually not the preferable option);  
 in a semi-quantitative way using risk matrices, or  
 quantitatively, i.e. by performing a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) with more elaborated 
techniques. 
One of the most common representations of risk is through a risk matrix. A typical risk matrix - 
including the possible consequences to the different recipients listed above (People, Environment, Asset, 
Reputation) - is shown in Figure 5.3. The levels of the possible consequences are not univocal but are 
defined accordingly in every methodology.  The same is valid for the definition of frequency or probability 
intervals. 
The extent of the work contained in RoMHs on major hazard identification and risk assessment 
depends on the complexity of the installation.  
This can best be expressed in Figure 5.4, which highlights the need for increasing depth of the various 
analyses as the complexity of the installation increases. For instance, the risk assessment work in a RoMH 
for a small unattended gas platform will be completely different from a mixed oil/gas production complex. 
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Figure 5 3 Typical Risk Matrix including consequences on different recipients (PEAR) 
 
 
Figure 5 4 Appropriate levels of risk evaluation techniques 
In assessing these aspects of a RoMH, CAs will need to refer to the requirements of Directive 
2013/30/EU, and particularly ensure that the RoMH has all the required factual information.  
The risk evaluation should take into account the entire life cycle of the installation, from design to 
subsequent decommissioning, focusing on how the proposed measures would reduce risk to an acceptable 
level, and whether good practice, sound engineering practice, and recent technical and technological 
advances have been considered.  A list of questions to support CAs personnel during the assessment of the 
relevant part of the RoMH is provided in Annex 3. 
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5.2 Case Study 
 
Exercise 
Case study: "Marina" platform Simultaneous Operations with the Jack-Up "Offshore MODU" 
Read the extract from the risk assessment report of the Marina Platform Combined Operations (see 
additional material) and answer the following questions:  
 
a. Does it meet the Directive’s hazard and risk assessment requirements? 
b. If not, what issues would you ask the operator to rectify, and why?  
c. In which parts, will you ask for additional information and what would that be? 
 
Objective of the Exercise: to gain experience in considering a RoMH, and to identify common 
challenges during the assessment process. 
 
Key Message: 
It is important to verify that an operator or owner has identified the consequences in order to install 
proper control and mitigation measures, using appropriate well-known methods.  
 
Key Message: 
The final outcome of the Risk Assessment section of the RoMH should be the identification of the 
necessary control, protection and mitigation measures according to the identified hazards and 
potential risks, and their subsequent implementation, rather than the mere calculations and the 
resulting numbers. 
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Exercise Conclusion 
The example of “Marina Platform” risk assessment shows that nice graphical representations do not 
necessarily imply a proper and consistent Risk Assessment process.  
  
Although the document had several risk matrices for different operations performed on board, it still lacked 
some main features which are explicitly demanded in the Directive, i.e.: 
 The list of activities was limited, particularly activities of combined/simultaneous operation; 
 Events' likelihood and consequence description;  
 Methods and techniques used for risk evaluation; 
 Major hazard events were not clear; 
 Correlation between mitigation measures and risk assessment results; 
 Not clear if consultants were used to undertake this risk assessment. 
 
In addition the following items were not included in this section of the RoMH: 
 A general introduction in line with the RoMH, including number of workers, vicinity to sensitive areas,  
etc.; 
 P&IDs, general layout of the installation, flow charts, etc.; 
 Adherence to standards/guidelines, references; 
 Roles and responsibilities of key personnel. 
 
Some practical advice for CAs is not to “get lost” within the document during the assessment, but rather to 
focus on partial items, such as mitigation measures or risk assessment of specific activities.  
Use the guidelines provided in Annex 3 to facilitate and structure the assessment process.   
Note. Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification results are the base on which the entire RoMH is developed. Therefore, 
they need to be of high quality and well supported. 
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6 Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) 
 6.1 SEMS Policy 
 6.2 SEMS Organisation 
 6.3 SEMS Procedures 
 6.4 SEMS Monitoring and Auditing 
 6.5 SEMS Review 
 
The installation Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) is another key part of the 
operator or owner’s arrangements for ensuring major hazard control. The SEMS features in various parts of 
the Directive, sometimes with overlapping requirements.  In summary: 
 The SEMS, or an adequate description, shall be included in the RoMH [Article 11(1)(b), Article 
19(3)];  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The SEMS shall include the broad aspects of Article 19(5)(b) and the specific Annex I (9) issues; 
 
 The RoMH shall contain information regarding the SEMS that is relevant to the installation [Annex I 
(2) (10) & (3) (11)]; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 19 (5)(b)  
the safety and environmental management system shall be integrated within the overall management 
system of the operator or owner and shall include organisational structure, responsibilities, practices, 
procedures, processes and resources for determining and implementing the corporate major accident 
prevention policy. 
 
Annex I(9) 
The safety and environmental management system to be prepared pursuant to Article 19(3) and 
submitted pursuant to point (b) of Article 11(1) shall include but not be limited to: 
(1) organisation structure and personnel roles and responsibilities; 
(2) identification and evaluation of major hazards as well as their likelihood and potential consequences; 
(3) integration of environmental impact into major accident risk assessments in the report on major 
hazards; 
(4) controls of the major hazards during normal operations; 
(5) management of change; 
(6) emergency planning and response; 
(7) limitation of damage to the environment; 
(8) monitoring of performance; 
(9) audit and review arrangements; and 
(10) the measures in place for participating in tripartite consultations and how actions resulting from 
those consultations are put into effect. 
 
Article 11 (1)(b) 
[…] the safety and environmental management system applicable to the installation, or an adequate 
description thereof, in accordance with Article 19(3) and (5). 
Article 19 (3) Member States shall ensure that operators and owners prepare a document setting out their 
safety and environmental management system which is to be submitted pursuant to point (b) of Article 
11(1). 
Annex I (2), (3) 
Reports on major hazards …shall contain at least the following information: 
Annex I (2) (10) 
information, regarding the operator’s safety and environmental management system, that is relevant to 
the production installation 
Annex I (3) (11) 
information, regarding the safety and environmental management system, that is relevant to the non-
production installation 
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 The Corporate Major Accident Prevention Policy (CMAPP) should also be submitted to the CA with 
the RoMH [Article 11(1)(a) & Annex I (8)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In assessing the SEMS aspects of a RoMH, it is recommended to start with the CMAPP. The CMAPP is 
submitted with the RoMH, but it is not part of the RoMH. Therefore, it is not to be “accepted” by the 
Competent Authority.  However, the RoMH's Safety and Environmental Management System has to be 
clearly linked to the CMAPP, and so if the CMAPP is deficient, so will the installation’s SEMS.  
The CMAPP is quite a high-level document, but is a crucial “umbrella” under which particular 
installations SEMS will function.   Guidance when considering the adequacy of a CMAPP is given in Annex 4. 
Standards relevant to offshore SEMS include the following: 
 ISO 14001 – Environmental Management Systems; 
 OHSAS 18001 – Occupational Health & Safety Management Systems, which is due to be replaced by 
ISO 45001 in 2017; 
 ISO 9001 – Quality system Requirement. 
In addition, IADC MODU HSE Case Guidelines and, to a lesser extent, API RP 755 also provide some 
helpful direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, the usual framework for SEMS in the offshore industry may follow either of two similar 
“cycles”, i.e.: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Recommended Practice for development of a safety and environmental management programme for offshore operations and 
facilities 
Example.  
When the operator or the owner adopts a new SEMS at the production/non-production installation, 
following the change of installation’s ownership or changes at a corporate level, then such SEMS should 
be reassessed. The definition of material change (as given in Article 2(30b) of Directive 2013/30/EU) 
would apply, therefore the amended RoMH would also need to be submitted to the Competent 
Authority. 
Article 11 (1) (a) 
Member States shall ensure that the operator or the owner submit to the competent authority the 
following documents: (a) the corporate major accident prevention policy or an adequate description 
thereof, in accordance with Article 19(1) and (5) 
Article 2, (30) (b)  
Material   change   means:  
- in   the   case   of   a   notification   of   well   operations   or   combined    operations,    a    change    to    
the    basis    on    which     the     original     notification     was     submitted     including,       inter       alia,       
physical       modifications,       replacement   of   one   installation   with   another,   availability   of   new   
knowledge   or   technology   and   operational  management  changes; 
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In assessing the different aspects of the SEMS, Competent Authorities should first consider some high-
level questions regarding the SEMS overall effectiveness:  
 Is the SEMS structure logical and clear? Does it correlate to a standard? 
 How well does the SEMS integrate into other company management systems? 
 Can the SEMS actually be delivered on the installation? Is it up-to-date? Does it reflect existing 
arrangements/equipment? 
 Does the SEMS overall clearly link with the CMAPP?  
6.1 SEMS Policy 
In then moving on to considering the “policy or plan” aspects of the SEMS, the following areas should inter 
alia be considered: 
 Are the installation specific policies and objectives of the installation SEMS clear? For instance, 
are there annual installation HSEQ plans? 
 Does the SEMS reflect and develop the high level/strategic safety and environmental policies 
and objectives in the CMAPP?  
 Is there a demonstration of commitment from senior leadership? 
 Is the relationship between the SEMS and other company management systems clear? 
 What standards/guidelines were used for SEMS? 
 How has the SEMS developed over time? This is particularly important where there has been a 
significant change such a change of ownership resulting in the introduction of new policies and 
management system approaches. 
 
 
6.2 SEMS Organisation 
In relation to the assessment of the broad organisational aspects of the SEMS, the following should be 
taken into account: 
 Organisational structure: 
 Are there clear organisational charts?  Do they cover both for installation and onshore 
support teams and services (where relevant)? 
 Are the reporting lines to senior company management clear? 
 Roles and Responsibilities: 
 Are HSE roles, responsibilities and authorities clearly defined and explained for all positions 
in the organisation? Generic or specific?  
 Are the SEMS roles/responsibilities sufficiently focused on MH risks and cover “leadership”? 
 Does the allocation of roles/responsibilities seem sensible? 
 Is workforce participation covered adequately? 
 Have resources been considered to match responsibilities? For instance, are there sufficient 
levels of knowledgeable, competent persons to cover the specific roles?  Are there any 
staffing-level concerns? Is there sufficient provision for competent health, safety and 
environmental advice to line management? 
Key Message: 
Particular attention to the SEMS Policy is required when an operator or owner registered 
outside a MS jurisdiction comes for the first time to operate in EU waters. 
 
Safety and Environmental Management Systems 
27 
 
6.3 SEMS Procedures 
To be effective, procedures within an installation’s SEMS should “flow” from the company’s overall 
approach, rather than from the specific requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU. SEMS procedures will cover 
both major hazard and lower risk issues, but as part of the RoMH assessment there will be a need to focus 
on the major hazard areas.   
An initial assessment of SEMS procedures should be carried out, before progressing to a more in-depth 
consideration of the core procedures for major hazard control. Initial assessment of suitability should 
include such issues as: 
 Are the procedures logically selected? Do they cover the key MH issues? 
 Are all the specific Directive topics covered? 
 Is the overall process for establishing and maintaining procedures adequate and robust? 
 Do they follow good practise/industry standards? 
 Is sufficient attention given to human and organisational factors?   
The next level of SEMS assessment should move to the procedures themselves, which will detail the 
hardware and management/organisational controls over a wide range of topics. 
There is no defined list of “procedures” for major hazard control, as they need to be bespoke to the 
company and installation, and will depend on its major hazard profile.  However, there is a core list of 
major hazard control procedures which will need to be comprehensively covered within any RoMH, as 
shown below: 
 
0                      
 
 
 
 
Detailed question sets for the assessment of such core procedures are contained in Annex 5.  In 
addition, chapter 10 of this guideline describes in more details the assessment of the RoMH Independent 
Verification requirements, which can be considered as a sub-set of an installation’s SEMS. 
 
 
 
Key Message: 
Management of change is an important element and rigorous base for 
continuous improvement in the SEMS “cycle” framework. 
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6.4 SEMS Monitoring and Auditing 
Directive 2013/30/EU specifically requires the monitoring or audit arrangements within a SEMS 
(broadly equivalent to the “Check” phase outlined in the “plan-do-check-act” circle) to be included in the 
RoMH. It is sometimes difficult or irrelevant to judge when monitoring and auditing finishes and review 
starts. 
Monitoring is the sum of the day-to-day activities which organisations do to ensure their performance 
on a continuous basis, whereas Auditing covers more formal, discrete compliance assessment.  So, the 
assessment of both aspects together may be an adequate approach on occasions. 
 
 
When assessing the monitoring arrangements, CAs should ensure that the RoMH demonstrates that 
there is a comprehensive and deliberate process for monitoring health, safety and environmental 
performance: 
 Does the SEMS cover both proactive and reactive monitoring processes? 
 Is there a logical process to identify monitoring requirements? 
 Is there a sufficient breadth of monitoring activities? Do they cover contractors’ performance 
as well as core crew? 
 Are the performance standards being monitored clear? 
 Are the monitoring activities themselves covered by specific procedures? 
 Is the appropriate level of management involved in reviewing monitoring results and taking 
actions? 
 Is there an appropriate mix of effective leading and lagging indicators? 
When assessing the auditing arrangements, CAs should expect a thorough description of the audit 
process, with details of the audit programme.  Key issues to cover include the following: 
 How are audit topics selected? Is the scope of the audits, and their style and frequency, 
appropriate? 
 Details of the competency (and independence) of the audit teams, and their roles; 
 How are the results of the audits reported back? How are they subsequently reviewed by the 
installation? How are appropriate levels of senior management involved? 
 Is the system for monitoring the close-out of actions robust? 
 How is the delivery of the audit programme monitored? 
Monitoring  
HSE daily reporting, occupational safety observations, walk through, good behaviour and best practices 
awards etc. 
Monitoring could also include: 
 Day-to-day supervision activities; 
 Management and employee representative workplace “inspections”; 
 Senior onshore management visits to the installation; 
 Monitoring of a wide range of data, such as alarm trips, quality checks on Permits-to-work, 
environmental discharges, progress with planned maintenance programmes etc.; 
 Incident and “near miss” reporting and investigation outcomes; 
 Workforce behavioural safety initiatives/process; 
 Results of independent verification activities. 
 
Auditing  
Formal activity performed by an independent person outside the installation. It aims at verifying 
particular SEMS processes, implementation of procedures and corporate standards, etc. 
The results of an audit should be incorporated into the continuous improvement of the SEMS framework. 
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6.5 SEMS Review 
 
Review is the final part of the Plan->Do->Check–>Act cycle and this small, but vital, part of the RoMH is 
also specifically highlighted in Directive 2013/30/EU. During the assessment of the SEMS review 
arrangements, CAs should look for: 
 Evidence of a system for a periodic review of the whole of the SEMS arrangements.  Is this led by an 
appropriate level of senior management? 
 The mechanism whereby the findings from reviews influence the company’s overall 
strategy/arrangements; 
 A demonstration that the company has a process to proactively capture lessons from others in the 
industry – examples could include specific responsibilities on corporate HSE professionals to 
monitor global trends, the involvement in company staff in industry-wide safety or environmental 
initiatives, and specific benchmarking exercises. 
 A commitment for continuous improvement. 
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7  Equipment and Arrangements 
 7.1 Use of Standards in RoMH Assessment 
 7.2 General assessment of “equipment and arrangements” 
 7.3 Assessment of Fire & Explosion aspects 
 7.4 Assessment of Well Control aspects  
 
The logic of the RoMH process is that once the major hazard risks have been identified and assessed, 
appropriate control measures can be adopted.  Directive 2013/30/EU contains requirements which focus 
on some key risk areas on offshore installations, and introduces specific requirements that the RoMH 
should contain, such as: 
 “a description of equipment and arrangements to ensure well control, process safety, containment 
of hazardous substances, prevention of fire & explosion, protection of workers from hazardous 
substances, and the protection of the environment from an incipient major accident […]” [Annex I 
(2)(7) & (3)(6)]; 
 “a description of the arrangements to protect persons on the installation from major hazards […]” 
[Annex I (2)(8) & (3)(7)]; 
  “a demonstration that…major hazard control measures are suitable […]” [Annex I (2)(5) & (3)(5)]. 
As highlighted previously, these requirements in the Directive are slightly overlapping. 
7.1  Use of Standards in RoMH Assessment 
The RoMH is required to contain information about the “relevant codes, standards and guidance”6 
used in the construction and commissioning of the installation, and hence reference to such standards, 
guidance, etc., is a key part in establishing whether the RoMH demonstrates “relevant good practice”.   
However, a wide range of standards and guidelines are available for use in the offshore industry, and 
there is no unique list of standards.   
OGP Report 426 “Regulators’ Use of Standards”7 gives some very helpful background to this, and 
identifies the ranges of standards and guidelines used by offshore regulators across the globe.  Although it 
was published in 2010, the information contained therein is still very relevant.   
Adherence to a code or standard is not necessarily a 
demonstration of safety, as it may be out-of-date, of limited 
technical relevance or application to the issue, or has a limited 
scope. 
During the assessment, CAs should ensure that any quoted standard is appropriate, and - given the 
amount of overlapping codes (ASME, API, ISO, DNV, etc.) - consider whether the quoted standard/code is 
the appropriate choice. If in doubt, the CA should ask the operator/owner for further justification on the 
use of a particular standard, when a more appropriate one appears to be available.  
An accepted hierarchy of standards/guidelines is available, as shown in Figure 7.1 below. 
 
                                                          
6
 Annex I, Part 2(9) and Part 3(8) 
7 http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/426.pdf  
Key Message: 
Reference to a code is not necessarily 
a demonstration of safety 
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Figure 7 1 Hierarchy of standards 
7.2 General assessment of “equipment and arrangements” 
In assessing the equipment and arrangements sections of a RoMH, CAs will need to ensure that: 
 Good practice, sound engineering principles and human and organisational factors have been 
taken into account for the range of issues; 
 It is clear how the proposed measures reduce risk to an acceptable level; 
 Risk management takes into account the life cycle of the installation. 
There are some common issues which CAs will face when assessing RoMHs, and these can become 
particularly apparent when looking at equipment and arrangements. Such issues are summarised in the 
Table 7.1 below. 
Table 7 1 Equipment and arrangements issues in RoMH assessment 
Issue Comment 
1. Use of Generic statements and/or assertion of 
compliance with inadequate justification 
E.g. “Complies with all relevant codes”, “in accordance 
with IADC HSE MODU guidelines”.  More specific 
justifications/explanations may be needed to allow 
the CA to be convinced. 
2.  Variation in amount of technical detail in the 
RoMH. 
 A lack of sufficient detailed information will prevent 
the CA from fully understanding the issues, and hence 
prevent an adequate scrutiny.  Conversely, too much 
information with questionable relevance to major 
hazard issues raises question of quality control of the 
RoMH by the operator/owner. 
3.  Emphasis on hardware descriptions, at the 
expense of procedures and hazard controls 
The CA Assessment team will need to seek this 
additional information either from other parts of the 
RoMH, or via a request for more details. 
4.  Difficulty in matching particular sections of a 
RoMH to the detailed requirements of the 
Directive 
As the Directive’s requirements are not conducive to a 
“standard” RoMH layout, the assessment process will 
need to adopt a holistic approach, seeking additional 
information from different parts of the RoMH when 
considering specific Directive requirements. 
5.  Lack of reference to the installation’s major 
hazard risks, or excessive emphasis on personal 
“occupational” injury scenarios 
Raises doubts over whether the proposed control 
measures are sufficiently integrated to the major 
hazard profile.  Seek further reassurance from the 
operator/owner. 
6. Technical inconsistencies To be dealt with as they arise. 
7.  Practical problems in understanding the 
RoMH.  For example, widespread use of 
acronyms, poor pagination, or inadequate 
reference to more detailed plant layout diagrams 
and process flow information when necessary. 
Needs to be raised at an early stage of assessment.  
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Two of the prime major hazards on offshore oil and gas installations arise from a  lack of well control 
and from fire and explosion from the wide range of flammable substances which are likely to be present 
there (in a wide range of containment - from small bore pipework to large pressure vessels).  
Directive 2013/30/EU specifically requires the RoMH to contain “a description of equipment and 
arrangements to ensure well control and prevention of fire and explosion […]”. These aspects are dealt with 
in more detail in the following sections (7.3-7.4). 
7.3 Assessment of Fire and Explosion aspects 
Prevention of loss of containment of flammable substances is the key issue in case of fire and 
explosion. Loss of containment could have a wide range of causal factors, including inadequate initial 
integrity from poor initial design or installation, equipment operating outside its operating parameters, 
gradual integrity deterioration due to factors such as corrosion, fatigue or vibration, and even catastrophic 
deterioration.   
The hierarchy of measures8 that operators/owners should adopt within their RoMH for the 
prevention of loss of integrity should start at designing out, or reducing, the flammable hazard.  For 
instance, optimising plant layouts, reducing 
inventories, ensuring separate jackets for 
accommodation and production, and even 
considering unmanned facilities, may be used to 
this purpose. 
Prevention of hazardous loss of containment events is the following stage, which includes: 
 maintaining the plant to design requirements; 
 operating within design limits by implementing robust procedures/arrangements; 
 managing modifications; 
 establishing adequate periodic inspection regimes.   
Once a loss of containment event occurs, issues often depicted on the right-hand side of the Bow-tie 
models become crucial, including detection that a loss of containment event has occurred, and the 
subsequent application of mitigation measures to reduce the consequences.   
The final part of the loss of integrity hierarchy is the systematic approach to Emergency Response and 
Environmental Protection.   
 When considering RoMHs, Competent Authorities will need to assess whether the operator/owner 
has demonstrated a coherent approach in identifying their own fire and explosion (F&E) “equipment & 
arrangements”.  The quality of the work done to identify potential MH events is crucial, with the need for 
comprehensive F&E reviews/studies/modelling to obtain information on which to base the installation’s 
prevention/mitigation measures, and thus influence the F&E equipment & arrangements on board. 
Following the loss of containment hierarchy is one approach for the assessment of the Fire and 
Explosion sections of a RoMH, as described in the Table 7.2 below. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 This hierarchy of preventative measures is equally applicable to hazardous substance containment, i.e. another specific risk which 
Directive 2013/30/EU requires to be covered within the Equipment & Arrangements section of a RoMH.  
Key Message: 
Design aspects should be verified prior to RoMH 
submission through a Design Notification. 
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Table 7 2 Measures for the prevention of loss of integrity 
Integrity Hierarchy Comments 
1. Design considerations 
E.g. ISO 13702:2015 “Control and Mitigation of F&E on 
Offshore Production Installations” 
2. Adequacy of controls 
 Operational procedures, including start-up and shut-
down, which take into account human and 
organisational factors 
 Maintenance procedures, including Permits to Work, 
modification approvals etc. 
 Ensuring performance standards for associated 
systems (audit) and hardware (verification). 
3. Detection issues 
 
 Range of detectors likely, covering smoke, flame, 
flammable atmospheres, toxic gas etc.  Location and 
types of detector should be based on outcomes of 
MH assessment and F&E/Hazardous substances 
modelling 
 Alarms and alarm handling (especially control room) 
issues 
 Arrangements when detection systems are 
degraded. 
4. Source of ignition controls 
 
Zoning for intrinsically safe electrical equipment. 
5. Adequacy of mitigation 
arrangements 
 Passive fire protection (e.g. main structural 
members and process vessels) 
 Deluge and Sprinkler systems – what 
rates/coverage? 
 Fire and Blast walls 
 Other fire control equipment such as portable 
equipment. 
6. Emergency response & 
Environmental protection 
See chapters 8 and 9 
 
7.4  Assessment of Well Control aspects  
The information within the RoMH related to well control should reflect the fact that loss of well 
control can arise from a range of scenarios, including shallow gas formations, lack of pressure management 
during drilling and completions, failure of containment/control components, and dropped object damage. 
Well control is not just limited to the BOP – other equipment is necessary! 
The structure recommended in the IADC MODU HSE Guidelines is generally used in RoMHs for mobile 
drilling units. With respect to equipment and arrangement, the guidelines follow the drilling process, from 
handling “tubulars” (drill pipe and casing), the mud and cementing systems, Blowout Preventer systems, 
and also covering any subsea capability. 
CA assessment should look for a clear demonstration that well control systems are designed, 
constructed and maintained to appropriate standards, and that the control systems provide for the range 
of drilling activities which are anticipated.  
The RoMH should not just contain a description of the installation’s hardware, but needs well control 
arrangements as well, such as: 
 Standard Operating Procedures; 
 Well Control Manual; 
Equipment and Arrangements 
34 
 
 Initial competency assurance; 
 Continuing competency arrangements, such as drills; 
 Well monitoring process, for example kill sheets. 
 
 
Well Control equipment and arrangements should not just be limited to Non-Production RoMHs, but 
should also feature in Production RoMHs. For instance, arrangements for continuing well integrity 
monitoring, procedures for Combined Operations involving well entry, and well work-overs should also be 
considered.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example.  
At the time of submission of a RoMH, the owner of the drilling rig may not possess complete (geological) 
information on the reservoir which would justify the choice of specific equipment. However, the RoMH 
should include sufficient information to identify the range of reservoirs for which its equipment would be 
suitable, for example a description of the rig’s maximum drilling capability (i.e. drilling depth, pressure 
drilling pump, etc.) and capability for components’ adjustment, such as additional BOP components. 
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Exercise 
 
The “Drill King” drilling rig is contracted to undertake an exploratory drilling programme in your waters, as 
soon as it has completed its current drilling programme in the Gulf of Mexico. When the rig owners, Regal 
Drilling Inc., submit the RoMH for your acceptance they assure you that it complies with the latest edition 
of the IADC MODU HSE Case Guidelines, V3.6, which they emphasise, have been updated following the 
Directive 2013/30/EU.  They also state that all the information relating to well control equipment and 
arrangements were contained in Part 3 of the RoMH, which is attached. 
The full text of the extract from Section 3 of the Drill King RoMH is found in Annex 8. 
Read the extract from the Drill King RoMH, and then answer the following:  
 
a. What difficulties did you have, as an individual, in considering and understanding the Drill King 
RoMH? What additional expertise you would you need with the project team to help assess this 
topic?     
b. List the areas where you feel the RoMH is insufficient to enable you to accept that the Drill King’s 
well control equipment and arrangements, “if implemented, meet the requirements of the 
Directive”. For each of the areas, decide on the action you would ask Regal Drilling to take to 
resolve your concerns. 
 
Objective of the Exercise: to gain experience of some of the challenges encountered during the 
assessment of a RoMH. 
Exercise Conclusion 
 
Common issues when assessing RoMHs: 
 
1. Use of generic statements – e.g. “standard layout”, “Yutson class”, “all relevant codes” etc.  
2. Assertions of compliance, with inadequate justification –e.g. “complies with the MODU Code”, 
“accepted by Classification Bodies”, “in accordance with IADC HSE guidelines” etc.  
3. Lack of sufficient detailed information to allow full understanding or scrutiny.  
4. Conversely, sometimes too much information on some issues, with questionable relevance to 
major hazard risks unclear – why such inconsistency? Is it just “cut and paste”?  Could indicate 
lack of quality control or ownership of RoMH.  
5. Emphasis on hardware description at the expenses of procedures and their adequacy. 
6. Process flow charts - no reference, or inability to access, process flow charts, layout diagrams 
P&IDs etc. 
7. Lack of reference to identified Major Hazard risks – does this indicate a lack of integration of the 
installation equipment/procedures to its major hazard risks?  
8. Issues of Acronyms – e.g. WRTS (Wireline Riser Tensioner System), HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit), 
APV (air pressure vessel) etc. 
9. Emphasis on personal injury. 
10. Ignores obvious hazardous chemical issues – mud and chemical mixing/handling, radioactive 
source handling/storage etc.  
11. The holistic nature of RoMH assessment – very difficult to deal with well control just with this 
RoMH Part 3 – other issues such as training/competence, procedures, hazard identification are 
all required.  
12. Technical inconsistencies – e.g. BOP (6000’) does not match proposed depth (7000’), and choke 
& kill manifold pressure (12000 psi) is less than the BOP max rated pressure (15000 psi)  
13. Lack of Competent Authority expertise in some areas of technology. 
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8 Emergency Response: Safety Aspects 
 8.1. Internal Emergency Response Plans 
 8.2. What to look for when assessing a RoMH 
This Section covers the assessment of the emergency response aspects of a RoMH.  It focuses on the 
safety aspects for those on the installation, whereas the consideration of the potential for subsequent 
environmental response is covered separately in Chapter 9.  
During the consideration of RoMH’s emergency response arrangements, it is important that 
Competent Authorities bear in mind the links between the internal actions by the operator or owner 
following an emergency and the wider requirements in Directive 2013/30/EU (Article 29) for Member 
States to prepare their own external emergency response plans with respect to the offshore oil and gas 
installations in their waters.   
These external plans, which include the role of the Member State in coordinating and responding to 
industry response, may not be under the responsibility of the Competent Authority within the relevant 
Member State, but are likely to be under other public authorities, such as the Coast Guard service or the 
Navy. 
With respect to RoMH’s emergency response arrangements, Directive 2013/30/EU requires the RoMH to 
contain: 
 a “description of the arrangements to protect persons from major hazards, and ensure safe 
escape, evacuation and rescue…and arrangements to prevent damage…to the environment 
in the event that all personnel are evacuated”. [Annex I (2) (8) & (3)(7)]; 
  “an internal emergency response plan or an adequate description thereof” [Annex I (2) (11) & 
(2) (12)]. 
 
8.1 Internal Emergency Response Plan 
The installation's Internal Emergency Response Plan (IERP) needs to include, as a minimum, defined 
information as required by Annex I (10) of Directive 2013/30/EU, summarised in Table 8.1. 
Emergency response arrangements within a RoMH are often based on specific reports from marine or 
other consultants or specialists.  
The arrangements should be based on a clear identification of the major hazard events which give rise 
to fires and explosions, and other significant events such as ship collision, exceptional weather, ballasting 
problems, etc., which could result in the need to take immediate action to protect the safety of personnel, 
even leading to their prompt removal from the installation. 
Annex I (2)(8) 
“a description of the arrangements to protect persons on the installation from major hazards, and to ensure 
their safe escape, evacuation and rescue, and arrangements for the maintenance of control systems to prevent 
damage to the installation and the environment in the event that all personnel are evacuated” 
Annex I (3)(7) 
“a description of the arrangements to protect persons on the installation from major hazards, and to ensure 
their safe escape, evacuation and rescue, and arrangements for the maintenance of control systems to prevent 
damage to the installation and the environment in the event that all personnel are evacuated” 
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Part of the work in identifying such arrangements should include the identification of the standards of 
performance of the measures for protecting personnel and ensuring effective evacuation and escape, and 
subsequent rescue. 
Table 8 1 Minimum content of Internal Emergency Response Plans (pursuant to Directive 2013/30/EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directive 2013/30/EU specifies three stages in emergency incident management, i.e.  protection, 
evacuation and escape. 
 
 
 
Guidance on these various aspects of offshore emergency response is contained in the following 
publications: 
 ISO 15544:2000 “Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry – Offshore Production Installations – 
Requirements and Guidelines for Emergency Response”; 
 IADC MODU HSE Case Guidelines (Part 5); 
 IMO MODU Code for Construction & Equipment of MODUs. 
Protection refers to the actions needed to secure the safety of personal on the installation whilst a major 
accident/incident is in progress and before conditions are controlled or personnel are able to be 
evacuated from the installation platform.  The prime “protection” arrangement is the provision of 
temporary safe refuges. 
 
Evacuation refers to the controlled removal of personnel from the installation via their primary means of 
evacuation such as using the installations normal methods of personnel transfer access (e.g. helicopters) 
or the prime designated mass evacuation methods such as lifeboats or TEMPSCs (Totally Enclosed Motor 
Propelled Survival Craft). 
 
Escape refers to the use of the installation’s secondary means of evacuation when the primary means 
are not available.  This includes a mass event (for instance when the primary TEMPSC are unable to be 
launched) or an escape of individuals who have become isolated on the installation from their designate 
primary evacuation means. 
 
Internal Emergency Response Plan – Content [Annex I (10)] 
 
 Names/positions of persons initiating and directing internal emergency response procedures, and for 
liaising with external emergency response authorities; 
 Arrangements for providing “early warning” of a major accident to external authorities and for 
coordinating internal and external response; 
 Description of all foreseeable events which could cause a major accident; 
 Description of actions to control conditions/events and limit their consequences; 
 Description of the equipment and resources available; 
 Arrangements for limiting risks to persons/environment, including how warnings to be given, and 
actions expected; 
 Arrangements for training personnel in the duties they will need to carry out; 
 Arrangements for Combined Operations, coordinating escape, evacuation and rescue between the 
installations; 
 Internal Emergency Response Plan requirements for environmental aspects (covered in Chapter 9). 
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8.2 What to look for when assessing a RoMH 
Table 8.2 identifies key areas for scrutiny during the assessment of the protection/evacuation/escape 
aspects of the arrangements in the RoMH. 
Table 8 2 Key aspects for Scrutiny 
Key aspects for Scrutiny Comments 
1. Is there a clear command structure? 
 
Roles and responsibilities of the team should be well 
defined, remembering contingency arrangements to 
duplicate roles. 
2. Selection and Competency of emergency 
team. 
To include both initial and refresher training requirements 
for the emergency team, including drills, “table top” practice 
exercises. 
3. Adequacy of response strategies.  
Do they cover all identified major accidents, including 
adverse weather? 
4. Instructions and training of everyone on 
the installation. 
Both general emergency response and survival training, and 
installation specific briefings and familiarity. 
5. Adequacy of arrangements for 
communication during emergencies. 
 The installation visual and audible alarms should be 
adequate for all on the installation – remember 
vulnerable positions such as divers. 
 Are contingency arrangements in place for 
communication systems during emergencies? 
 What about the adequacy of wider communication 
arrangements with onshore management, adjacent 
installations, coastguards etc.?    
6. Access to muster points and temporary 
refuges during emergencies. 
 Sufficiently protected designated routes and alternative 
arrangements, based on endurance time data. 
 Design and location of emergency lighting and escape 
indicators. 
 Any necessary PPE arrangements to reach temporary 
refuges (e.g. smoke hoods, escape respirators etc.) 
7. Temporary Refuges (TRs) and muster 
stations. 
 Location of primary and secondary TR. 
 TR design considerations (e.g. endurance time, 
impairment due to H2S, O2, smoke) and maintenance 
aspects (e.g. HVAC systems).Storage and specifications 
for survival suits, life jackets and PPE for emergency 
responders (firefighting, etc.). 
8. Evacuation issues. 
 
Primary means of evacuation should be normal route on/off 
installation, but alternative means (usually evacuation by 
sea) needed to take into account the range of emergency 
scenarios.  
9. Lifeboats and TEMPSCs. 
 
 Issues such as design, location, numbers, etc., should 
take into account need for additional capacity for 
contingencies – 150%?Arrangements for launching, 
crewing. 
10. Means of escape when evacuation not 
possible. 
 Wide range – including shutes, descenders, fixed ladders 
and stairways, plus life rafts or direct to sea. 
 A clear rationale behind choice, location, redundancy 
etc., taking into account any limitations and issues with 
actual deployment/use. 
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However, RoMH scrutiny also needs to include the arrangements for the safe recovery of personnel 
from either their prime means of evacuation, such as the lifeboats, or from secondary methods of escape 
which will also include personnel being in the sea.  Such rescue procedures should be based on a range of 
scenarios, and will almost inevitably rely on external facilities, such as standby vessels with rescue 
capability or larger Emergency Response and Rescue Vessels (ERRVs), although more limited events could 
involve installation-based fast rescue craft.  Rescue arrangements within a RoMH would need to 
demonstrate such issues as: 
 The rescue response and capacity matches sea immersion survival times; 
 Effective arrangements are in place for retrieving survivors for the range of potential 
scenarios, including from life rafts and directly from the sea;  
 The rescue response arrangements take into account limitations such as sea states, helicopter 
operating windows, ERRV availability;  
 Appropriate arrangements and facilities for the medical treatment of survivors. 
 
 
 
 
  
Exercise 
Read the extract from Section 7 of the Drill King RoMH which relates to Emergency Response 
(the full text is found in Annex 9), then answer the following questions:  
a. Are the emergency response arrangements based on a clear identification of the major 
accident emergency events?  What additional information would you need to assess? 
b. Identify the individual responsibilities on board Drill King when responding to a major 
emergency.  What additional information would you expect to find elsewhere in the 
RoMH or in supporting documents? 
c. The RoMH is light of the details of the evacuation and escape arrangement, so you ask 
Regal Drilling for the Drill King ERP.  What sort of information would you expect it to 
contain relating to evacuation/escape equipment and muster stations? 
 
Objective of the Exercise: 
 To identify the types of additional material you should expect to be available when 
considering a RoMH; 
 To gain experience on assessing strengths and weaknesses in a RoMH; 
 To consider in detail some key aspects of evacuation and escape. 
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9 Emergency Response: Environmental Aspects 
 9.1. The relationship between safety and environmental emergency response 
 9.2. What to look for when assessing the environmental response aspects of a RoMH – The 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
9.1 The relationship between safety and environmental emergency response 
This chapter is complementary to chapter 8 on the safety aspects of emergency response, as 
environmental response following a major incident should follow seamlessly from safety response. Once 
safety is assured, the focus of the emergency response should shift to protecting the environment.  
Chapter 8 describes the generic requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU with respect to emergency 
response arrangements in the RoMH, and these are as applicable to environmental protection and 
response as to the safety aspects covered in the previous chapter.   
However, the Directive has some additional specific environmental protection and response 
requirements, i.e.: 
 The detailed requirements for the Internal Emergency Response Plan (IERP) listed in Annex I (10) 
should also include: 
 Arrangements to limiting risks to the environment; 
 An estimate of oil spill effectiveness/an analysis of the oil spill response effectiveness, 
taking into account some defined aspects; 
 Evidence of prior assessment of any dispersant chemicals to minimise environmental 
damage; 
 Description of the equipment and resources available for capping any potential spill; 
 Coordination between internal and external response plans; 
 Operators and owners should prepare an “inventory” of equipment to implement the IERP, and this 
equipment will be particularly linked to their environmental response arrangements [Article 19(6) & 
Annex IV]. 
 
 The RoMH should contain an assessment of potential environmental effects resulting from a loss of 
containment of pollutants arising from a major accident, and a description of the technical and 
non-technical measures to prevent, reduce or offset them, including monitoring [Annex I (2) (16) 
and (3)(16)]. 
It is useful to bear in mind that, in the past, offshore environmental protection issues have been dealt 
with separately from safety issues.  Although Directive 2013/30/EU only refers to one IERP, there should be 
no major difficulty if the operator or owner has a separate internal Oil Spill Response Plan purely aimed at 
those internal emergency responses arrangements related to environmental protection. 
There is a wide range of potential environmental incidents from offshore installations, and these are 
often designated into three categories: 
 Tier 1 – small events, capable of being dealt with by the installation itself; 
Article 19 (6)  
Member States shall ensure that operators and owners prepare and maintain a complete 
inventory of emergency response equipment pertinent to their offshore oil and gas operation. 
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 Tier 2 – larger events, requiring assistance from others, but with consequences relatively 
confined to a local area; 
 Tier 3 – exceptional events, with environmental impact over a wide area, possibly even 
internationally. 
Tier 1 events are not likely to generate major environmental incidents as defined in the EU Directive, 
so the focus is on Tier 2 and Tier 3, which is also the scope of the External Emergency Response Plan (see 
chapter 8) that the Directive requires Member States to prepare. 
Marine oil pollution is not new, and a range of bi-lateral/multi-lateral agreements and organisations for Tier 
2 and 3 incidents already exist, such as the Bonn Agreement (for North Sea countries) and the Barcelona 
Convention (for the Mediterranean countries), REMPEC, EMSA and OSRL. There is a range of guidance on 
offshore environmental response, including: 
 IPIECA good practice guides (http://www.oilspillresponseproject.org/response/); 
 Oil & Gas UK guidelines: 
 Guidelines for the Management of Emergency Response for Offshore Installations; 
 Guidelines for the management of competence & training in emergency response for offshore 
installations; 
 “Oil Spill Response Tool Kit”, which includes guidance on aerial surveillance, aerial dispersant, 
etc.; 
 “The Oil Spill Response Effectiveness in UK Waters”, which provides generic assessment of 
response effectiveness, to which specific regional weather data can be added.   
9.2 What to look for when assessing the environmental response aspects of a RoMH – The 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Before considering the adequacy of the environmental aspects within a RoMH, it is highly 
recommended that those involved in the Competent Authority's assessment team are fully aware of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which is relevant for the particular offshore installation.  
The submission of EIAs for offshore oil & gas development is required by Directive 2011/92/EU (EIA 
Directive), and is part of the regulatory process that ensures that Member States take into account 
potential environmental implications of any offshore oil and gas development before any decisions to 
approve/authorize that development are made. The EIA will have been submitted well before any 
individual RoMH is received.   
Although the Member State’s offshore safety Competent Authority may or may not have a stake in 
the EIA authorization process, the information in the EIA will be of significance when subsequently 
considering the adequacy of any installation’s environmental protection response arrangements.  
The CA assessment of the environmental aspects of a RoMH ought to be aimed at the consequences of 
major environmental incidents, which are primarily the result of oil spills or discharge.  The focus of the 
environmental response arrangements will move away from the installation systems and onto the roles of 
the onshore emergency response teams and environmental response contractors.   
Key areas to assess are detailed in Annex 6, which provides a set of detailed questions for consideration 
during the RoMH assessment, and covers the following issues: 
 Environmental response management systems; 
 Use of environmental response contractors; 
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 Oil spill response equipment – storage, mobilising, etc.; 
 Training; 
 Different approaches to oil spill response – dispersants, booms, burning, surveillance, etc.; 
 Use of modelling, both in planning for scenarios and also real-time during an event; 
 Well capping devices and relief well drilling; 
 Likely effectiveness of oil spill response; 
 Coordination between Internal and External Emergency Response Plans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exercise 
 
A "Contingency Plan" has been included within a RoMH for a normally unattended oil and gas platform, 
situated 10 km from the coast and the onshore facilities. It is the installation's Internal Emergency 
Response Plan with respect to environmental issues. 
The full text of the Contingency Plan can be found in the additional material. 
 
Consider the document under the broad assessment topics in the table, and comment on the key 
assessment issues. 
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10 Independent Verification Schemes 
 10.1 Independent Verification 
 10.2 Case Study 
10.1 Independent Verification 
The requirement for an offshore installation’s Independent Verification Scheme is a relatively new 
development for offshore operators or owners working in some Member States.  However, it is an 
important requirement of Directive 2013/30/EU: 
 A description of the scheme of independent verification should be included with the RoMH [Article 
11(1)(d)]; 
 The scheme should include the broad aspects of Article 17; 
 The selection of the independent verifier, and the scheme itself, should meet the criteria listed in  
Annex V [Article 17(3)]; 
 The RoMH should contain a “description of the independent verification scheme” [Annex I (2)(12) & 
(3)(13)], which should in turn include the specific issues outlined in Annex I(5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common issues relating to assessment of the verification aspects of RoMHs include the following: 
 The consideration of the independence of those involved in verification, and the interaction 
between verification and the marine surveys undertaken by vessel classification societies; 
 The importance of the RoMH clearly demonstrating how the SECEs have been comprehensively 
identified, and for assessors being confident about the sufficiency of the areas identified as safety 
or environmentally critical; 
 The mechanism whereby performance standards are developed following the identification of 
SECEs; 
 The link between performance standards and the verification inspection or examination activities, 
including the difference between the verification activities for “active” and “passive” systems; 
Note. The Independent Verifier – as defined in Directive 2013/30/EU – does not necessarily have to be 
a third party verifier. However, the verifier should meet the criteria of Annex V. 
Note. Independent Verification is a requirement imposed on operators and owners: 
 Operators and  owners set up the scheme and frequency of the verifications; 
 Operators and owners decide what financial resources are to be invested into the verification 
process;  
 Directive 2013/30/EU does not request independent verifiers’ certificates check, it is in the 
hands of operators/owners to accept the Independent Verifier’s technical proficiency. 
The CA does not assess or approve the verification scheme, however:  
 the CA may encourage the operator or owner to consider Independent Verification as a layer 
of additional protection, rather than as a repetition of the already set-up assurance program;  
 Independent Verification is part of the RoMH, so in case CA assessment finds significant falls 
or queries related to the amount of examinations performed or if there are doubts on the 
verification scheme, the CA may raise it as part of CA questions on the RoMH. 
Example. In Ireland, before submitting the RoMH, the operator/owner must submit their choice of the 
Independent Verifier to the CA. The CA, in turn, would have to approve the Independent Verifier (or 
Independent Competent Body, as termed in the Irish framework). 
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 The challenge of ensuring that third party and contractor SECEs are included in the overall 
installation verification system.  
A range of assessment activity is therefore required by CAs.  Firstly, some broad issues to explore include 
the following questions: 
 Are the specific Directive requirements covered (for both the Verification Scheme itself and the 
selection of the Independent Verifier)? 
 Is there a logical and comprehensive process from Hazard Identification -> SECE identification -> 
Performance Standards -> Verification inspections/examinations?  
 How are the results of the verification activities used to maintain and improve safety and 
environmental protection? Are they supported by senior management? 
Secondly, the SEMS assessment guidance in Annex 5 (previously introduced at chapter 6.3) provides a set 
of further detailed questions for consideration during the assessment of the verification scheme aspects of 
a RoMH. 
 
 
 
 
 
10.2  Case Study 
 
 
 
 
 
Exercise: 
 
The Production Princess FPSO is shortly to be moved to your waters after the completion of five years in 
the South China Sea. They have submitted a RoMH, and you have been asked to decide whether the 
independent verification arrangements for this FPSO - as described in the extract from Section 5.4 of the 
RoMH in Annex 10 - are sufficient to allow your Competent Authority to accept it. 
 
The full text of Section 5.4 of the Production Princess FPSO RoMH is found in Annex 10. 
Read the extract from the RoMH, then answer the following:  
a. Using the “Assessment of Core SEMS” handout, list the general areas where you feel that the 
RoMH is insufficient to allow you to accept the Production Princess’ verification scheme 
arrangements. 
b. For each of the areas, decide what additional information you would ask for. 
c. Review the table of SECEs.  Are there any broad areas which have been omitted? What are they? 
d. Consider the fire protection SECEs for process vessels involving (i) sea water deluge and (ii) passive 
fire protection of process vessels. For both, what sort of performance standards would you expect, 
and what sort of verification inspection/examination would you consider to be appropriate? 
 
Objective of the Exercise: to gain experience in considering verification issues in RoMHs. 
 
 
Suggestion: 
An example of list of Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECEs) list 
can be found in Commission Implementing Regulation EU 1112/2014. 
[Section C]. 
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Exercise Conclusion 
 
Common issues relating to the assessment of verification aspects of RoMHs: 
1. The importance of the RoMH clearly demonstrating how the SECEs have been comprehensively 
identified. 
2. The consideration of the independence of those involved in verification, and the interaction 
between verification and the marine surveys undertaken by vessel classification societies. 
3. A broad feeling about the sufficiency of the areas identified as safety or environmentally critical 
– this RoMH omits a range of process SECEs such as containment and over-pressurisation 
elements and environmental spill response. 
4. The importance of how performance standards are developed following the identification of 
SECEs. 
5. The challenge of ensuring that 3rd party and contractor SECEs are included in the overall 
installation verification system. 
6. The link between performance standards and the verification inspection or examination 
activities, including the difference between the verification activities for “active” and “passive” 
systems.  
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11 Post Acceptance Issues 
 11.1 Material Changes 
 11.2 Well Operations Notifications 
 11.3 Combined Operations 
 11.4 Other notifications 
 11.5 Inspection and investigation 
 
Although the conclusion of the Competent Authority's RoMH assessment process is when the letter of 
RoMH acceptance is issued to the operator or owner, Directive 2013/30/EU does not anticipate that this 
will be the end of the CA involvement with the installation concerned.  Figure 4.1 identified a number of 
other formal processes where further CA acceptance or action is required during the lifecycle of the 
installation and, in addition, the Directive has expectations for the CA’s role in inspection, investigation and 
enforcement.  This Section covers these post-acceptance issues. 
11.1  Material Changes 
A material change to a RoMH is “a change to the basis on which the original report was accepted” 
[Article 2(30)].  
Material changes can include physical modifications on the installation, operational management 
changes, and “availability of new knowledge and technology”.   
Where material change modifications are to be made to an installation, the operator or owner has to 
first submit an amended RoMH to a deadline set by the relevant CA, and the proposed modifications 
cannot be brought into use until the Competent Authority has accepted the amended RoMH. 
Guidance in previous chapters of this report will be applicable to the assessment parts of a proposed 
amended RoMH following a material change notification.  CAs are advised to focus their considerations on 
the actual change being put forward, as this is not an opportunity for another full RoMH assessment.  It is 
important to create an assessment team to match the scope of the material change - most material change 
RoMH assessments will need a mixture of engineering, management system and human factor expertise. 
The CA must ensure that there is a clear allocation of assessment tasks, depending on the actual detail of 
the material change. 
Directive 2013/30/EU specifies in Annex I, Part (6) what is to be included in a material change 
notification. Therefore, the first task of considering such a notification is to ensure that it provides the 
required details: 
 Does the notification include a proposed amended RoMH and internal emergency response plan, 
with sufficient details of the change? 
 Is there a demonstration that Major Hazard risks are reduced to an acceptable level? 
 Is there a summary of the worker involvement in the revised RoMH?  
Also, it must be ensured that the CA assessment can be undertaken in an efficient manner, and that 
changes with respect to the original RoMH are clear. 
 
Some practical assessment guidance for material change assessment is the following: 
Key Message: 
Any changes from original RoMH shall be “highlighted”, it should be clear what operator or owner proposes to 
change.  
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 Is the breadth of the operator or owner’s risk assessment process adequate for the change?  
 Be careful about “reverse risk” 9 arguments.  
 Are all the consequences of the change identified? 
 An assessment of how well the installation’s own Management of Change (MoC) processes have 
been used for this material change will provide useful information upon which to aid an acceptance 
decision. 
 How well has the independent verifier been involved in this material change? Have their views 
been taken into account and, if not, why not? 
 How have human factor implications for the proposed material change been identified?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.2 Well Operations Notifications 
A Well Operation is “any operation concerning a well that could lead to a release…that has a potential 
for a major accident” [Article 2(24 – OSD]). Before undertaking a well operation, the well operator should 
submit a notification to a deadline set by the CA. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Well Operations Notifications shall provide comprehensive information, such as: 
 Full details of well work programme; 
 A risk assessment; 
 Details of any environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations; 
 A well examination report from the Independent Well Verifier; 
 A suitability statement for the well operator, linked to the well verifier’s report. 
Additionally, installations involved must have an accepted RoMH before well operations can commence. 
In responding to a Well Operations Notification, Competent Authorities need to appreciate that their 
role is slightly different from a material change notification.  Directive 2013/30/EU requires the CA to 
“consider” the well notification, and “if necessary take appropriate action […] which may include 
prohibiting […]”.   
                                                          
9
 Reverse Risk.  Some changes may initially alter the risk profile by increasing some risks, but that can be satisfactory if additional 
control measures are taken to lower the risk back to an acceptable risk. However, an argument sometimes put forward to justify 
cost cutting or “efficiency” changes is termed a “reverse risk “argument, where the justification of removing some layers of 
protection (and thus increasing the risk) is that lower costs will release resources which can be used for other safety or 
environmental protection systems elsewhere on the installation. That is not an acceptable approach. 
Example of incorrect “reverse risk” argument in case of material change. “…Several release valves of a 
pressure vessel are going to be removed, because of inaccessibility of their positions. Maintenance of 
these valves requires additional time and resources, and exposes maintenance workers to additional risk. 
Instead, such resources will be devoted to other safety aspects, such as life boat maintenance”. 
Key Message: The CA shall carefully verify the arguments for Material 
Change. Material Change shall not impact on the existing safety aspects. 
Example. The setting of the deadline lays within specific CA powers. For example, according to the Irish 
legislation, Well Operations Notifications shall be submitted six months prior to the commencement of 
the operations, while in the UK this period is 21 days. 
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Thus, the CA does not give specific acceptance to a Well Operations Notification, but has a duty to 
make some sort of regulatory response if it has concerns.  In addition to this initial notification is the 
requirement in the Directive for well operators to submit subsequent weekly reports to the CA, giving a 
summary of progress [Article 15(4)]. Therefore, the Directive anticipates ongoing CA oversight of such a 
well operation. 
Time is ticking as soon as the notification is received, as the onus is on the CA to take action “if 
necessary“. In the absence of any such action within the specified deadline, the well operation can go 
ahead.  
Upon receipt of a Well Operations Notification, the CA should initially scrutinise it to ensure the details 
meet all the Directive’s requirements, and then undertake a more in-depth consideration to assess whether 
the details of the notified operation are sufficiently in accordance with good practice to avoid the need for 
immediate CA action.  
In this respect, the report from the operator’s Independent Wells Verifier is very important, but CAs 
should not solely rely on findings of suitability within the Verifier report for their own CA decisions. 
Well operations are often highly technical, so it is inevitable that a CA will need well or reservoir 
engineering technical support to understand and scrutinise the notification.  Such arrangements and 
resources will need to be available at short notice to match the CA’s expressed deadline for such 
notifications. It is recommended that CAs establish good communications with their well operators, so that 
they have good intelligence about potential well operations before notification, to aid future resource 
planning.  
 
 
11.3 Combined Operations 
A combined operation occurs when one offshore installation works with another installation in an 
operation which could materially affect the safety and/or environmental risks on either installation.  
 
Before undertaking such a combined operation, the respective operators/owners should jointly 
prepare a Combined Operations Notification to the CA, to a deadline set by the CA. 
 
 
 
A notification of combined operations shall contain the following: 
 A description of the operation, and a programme of work; 
 Details of any equipment not described in either of the existing RoMHs; 
 A bridging document, agreed by both installations, of how the SEMS of the installations will be 
coordinated; 
Article 15 (4) 
Member States shall ensure that the operator of the well submits reports of well operations to the 
competent authority in accordance with the requirements of Annex II. The reports shall be submitted 
at weekly intervals, starting on the day of commencement of the well operations, or at intervals 
specified by the competent authority. 
Article 2 (25) 
“Combined Operation” means an operation carried out from an installation with another installation 
or installations for purposes related to the other installation(s) which thereby materially affects the 
risks to the safety of persons or the protection of the environment on any or all of the installation. 
Example. According to the UK legislation, Combined Operations Notifications shall be submitted at least 
21 days prior to the commencement of the operation. 
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 A summary of risk assessment, including risk controls. 
In handling a Combined Operation notification, the role of the Competent Authority is similar to wells 
notifications, i.e. one of considering and taking action if necessary, rather than “acceptance”.  The CA focus 
should be on the interaction between the two installations, and the effects that one installation could have 
on the other. 
As this involves two (or more) different companies or installations working together, with different 
processes, procedures and cultures, an effective bridging document is crucial. 
The initial work by the CA should be to ensure that the information requirements have been met. 
Subsequent work should include: 
 A scrutiny to ensure that the risk assessment process is valid, and has considered all the possible 
interactions and major hazard consequences; 
 An assessment of the adequacy of the bridging document.    
Practical assessment guidance on Combined Operations Notifications is given in Annex 7. 
 
11.4 Other notifications 
Directive 2013/30/EU defines two additional categories of post-acceptance notifications: 
 Operators/Owners to undertake a thorough Review of the RoMH every five years (or less), with the 
“results” of that review to be notified to CA [Articles 12 (7) & 13 (7)].  The CA is under no duty to 
take specific action on receipt of the thorough review results, but these would need to be 
considered as they could be an indication whether the RoMH is still appropriate and could inform 
future proactive work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 12 (7) 
The report on major hazards for a production installation shall be subject to a thorough periodic review by 
the operator at least every five years or earlier when so required by the competent authority. The results of 
the review shall be notified to the competent authority. 
Article 13 (7) 
The report on major hazards for a non-production installation shall be subject to a thorough periodic review 
by the owner at least every five years or earlier when so required by the competent authority. The results of 
the review shall be notified to the competent authority. 
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 Operators/owners who intend to dismantle a fixed installation, which is essentially a sub-category 
of a “material change”, should submit an amended RoMH for acceptance. 
 
 
Note. Abandonment of the well is considered to be an operation, thereby related to the Well Operations 
Notification. Dismantlement of fixed production installations is considered to be a modification, thereby 
related to the amended RoMH (in case of Material Change).  
Article 12 (5)  
Where modifications are to be made to the production installation that entail a material change, or it is 
intended to dismantle a fixed production installation, the operator shall prepare an amended report on 
major hazards, to be submitted pursuant to point (f) of Article 11(1) by a deadline specified by the 
competent authority, in accordance with Annex I, Part 6. 
Article 13 (4)  
Where modifications are to be made to the non- production installation that entail a material change, or it 
is intended to dismantle a fixed non-production installation, the owner shall prepare an amended report 
on major hazards, to be submitted pursuant to point (f) of Article 11(1) by a deadline specified by the 
competent authority, in accordance with Annex I, Part 6, points 1, 2 and 3. 
Key Message: 
A Notification of Combined Operations and Well Operations Notification are documents 
of informative character, and do not require official approval or acceptance from the CA. 
Key Message: 
The CA shall assure the RoMH is up to date every five years. The review to the RoMH shall be 
communicated to the operator or owner. 
Key Message: 
 Weekly monitoring of well operations is important for the CA, in order to react 
or intervene in the process; 
 Monitoring should be carried out by technical specialists; 
 Current practice for some CAs (CER-IE) is to demand well operations progress on 
a daily basis. 
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Table 11.1 summarizes the main activities in the life cycle of an offshore installation and the relevant 
documents to be submitted to the CA, as required by Directive 2013/30/EU.   
Table 11 1 An installation's lifecycle activities and required documentation as per Directive 2013/30/EU 
Production Installation 
ACTIVITY 
Type of Notification / Documentation required 
by the Directive 
Reference to Directive 
2013/30/EU 
Installation planning and design Design Notification  Article 11 (1)(3) 
Initial Planned Operations  RoMH Article 6 (5)  
Entering MS Waters 
Notification of Entering a Member State’s 
Waters 
Article 11 (4) 
Continuing Production 
RoMH Thorough Review (every 5 years or 
earlier) 
Article 12(7) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
Material change: 
 Modifications on the 
installation 
 Operational 
management changes 
 Availability of new 
knowledge and 
technology   
 
 
 
Material change amended RoMH  
Annex I (6) 
Change of Production 
Location 
Relocation notification Article 11(5) 
Well intervention Well operation notification  
Article 15 (1) Annex I (4) 
Annex II 
Combined Operations Combined Operation Notification Article 16 
Well abandonment Well Operations Notification 
Article 15 (1) 
Annex I (4) 
Leaving MS Waters 
Notification of Leaving a Member State’s 
Waters 
Article 11 (4) 
Dismantlement of a fixed production 
installation 
Amended RoMH Article 12 (6)  
Non-Production Installation 
ACTIVITY 
Type of Notification / Documentation 
required by the Directive 
Reference to Directive 
2013/30/EU 
Planned Operation  RoMH Article 6 (5)  
Entering MS Waters 
Notification of Entering a Member State’s 
Waters 
Article 11 (4) 
Continuing Operations 
RoMH Thorough Review (every 5 years or 
earlier) 
Article 13(7) 
O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
 
Material change: 
 Modifications on the 
installation 
 Operational 
management changes 
 Availability of new 
knowledge and 
technology   
Material change amended RoMH  Annex I (6) 
Well intervention such as   
drilling , well completion or 
abandonment 
Well Operation Notification  
Article 15 (1) 
Annex I (4) 
Annex II 
Combined Operations Combined Operation Notification Article 16 (1) 
Dismantlement 
For a fixed non-production installation only, 
amended RoMH 
Article 13 (5)  
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11.5 Inspection and investigation 
Directive 2013/30/EU requires Competent Authorities to oversee compliance with the Directive 
through inspections, investigations and enforcement actions.  Although these regulatory activities are 
somewhat outside the remit of this report, it is clear that Competent Authorities will need a clear strategy 
for proactive inspection and investigation work following RoMH acceptance.   
In addition to the Directive’s requirements, there will inevitably be expectations from the public and 
offshore workers that the “paper” RoMH, on its own, is not sufficient to secure compliance. 
A suggested proactive approach for a CA would be one focusing on offshore major hazard risks and 
implementing a programme of proactive post-acceptance activities to verify that the procedures and 
processes set out in accepted RoMHs are: 
a) consistently applied in practice and; 
b) deliver an appropriate control of risk. 
Such activities could be a mixture of onshore and offshore intervention activities, targeting installations or 
owners/operators on a transparent basis, with prioritisation taking into account factors such as relative 
risk, indications of poor performance, etc. 
 A suggested reactive approach would similarly have a clear strategy/process for investigating 
incidents, with transparent criteria about which incidents would be investigated by the CA, clarity of what 
the CA investigation would seek to achieve, and clear consistency in any enforcement decision-making.   
CAs will also have a reactive role for responding to complaints about installation safety and/or 
environmental protection standards, whether anonymous or not.  
CAs will need a clear process for responding to such complaints, which incorporates a proportionate 
approach, fairness in investigation (acknowledging confidentiality, where necessary) and, once again, 
consistency and openness in enforcement decision-making.
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12 Conclusions 
In order to ensure a high level of safety in the European offshore oil and gas industry, the EU 
Parliament and the Council published Directive 2013/30/EU, amending Directive 2004/35, obliging national 
Competent Authorities to control safety aspects of the offshore oil and gas installations in their waters.   
One of the fundamental new requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU is the preparation and submission 
by owners and operators of a Report on Major Hazards (RoMH) for every offshore installation. The RoMH 
aims at providing evidence that the overall risks from the installation (both to operators and to the 
environment) have been reduced to an acceptable level.  
The training course on the Assessment of Reports on Major Hazards: A focus on the technical aspects of 
the assessment was the first course to be held under the Virtual Centre of Offshore Safety Expertise 
(ViCOS). The course was held on October 13th-14th, 2016 at the JRC premises in Ispra, and it saw the 
participation of representatives from ten Member States.  
The two-day event aimed at providing participants with an understanding of RoMHs technical 
features, key contents and aspects to be considered during and after the assessment. Each session of the 
course consisted in presentations followed by group exercises. 
The present guidelines summarise the content of the presentations provided during the course, 
particularly: 
 The framework for RoMH assessment, i.e. the types and contents of the RoMH, the assessment 
and acceptance process; 
 Major hazard identification and risk assessment; 
 The Safety and Environmental Management System; 
 A general assessment of equipment and arrangements, with focus on the assessment of fires and 
explosions, and of well control aspects; 
 The aspects of safety and environmental protection in emergency response; 
 The independent verification scheme; 
 Post-acceptance issues, such as the assessment of well operations notifications and combined 
operations notifications; 
 Approaches to inspections and accident investigations. 
According to the feedback received, the training course was considered by the participants to be successful, 
well-organized and fruitful. The majority of the participants (63%) believed that it was an excellent course.  
The main author and provider of the training course was Mr. Steve Walker, former Head of Offshore 
Division at UK’s Health and Safety Executive, with the valuable contribution of Ms. Myrto Konstantinidou, 
safety expert at the Demokritos National Centre of Scientific Research. 
The JRC is grateful to the training providers for their work in the preparation of the training course and the 
present guidelines.  
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This publication is a report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and 
knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking 
process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. The 
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission accepts no responsibility or liability whatsoever with 
regard to this material and its use. Only European Union legislation published in the paper editions of the 
Official Journal of the European Communities is deemed authentic. This disclaimer is not intended to 
contravene any requirements laid down in applicable national law nor to exclude liability for matters which 
may not be excluded under that law.  
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Annex 1 - Agenda of the Training Course on the Assessment of Reports on Major Hazards 
Day 1 - 13
th
 October 2016, JRC Ispra, Italy 
08.30-09.00 – Registration & Coffee 
09.00-09.30 – Guided Tour of the JRC Visitors’ Centre 
Session I – Welcome & Introduction to the course, Chair: Shlomo Wald (EC -JRC) 
09.30-10.00 – Opening of the Training course: Welcome by the organizers 
• Stefano Tarantola (JRC): Welcome and domestic arrangements; 
• Steve Walker: Objectives of the course and outline of the agenda; 
• Introduction of the participants 
10.00-10.45 – Scene-setting and recap on Directive 2013/30/EU 
• General requirements of Directive 2013/30/EU (S. Tarantola, JRC). 
10.45-11.00 - Coffee/tea break 
Session II – Introduction to Reports on Major Hazards, Chair: Shlomo Wald (EC – JRC) 
11.00-12.45 – Introduction to how to assess Reports on Major Hazards (S. Walker) 
• Principles of assessment of RoMHs, processes and procedures, and personnel involved; 
• General issues when considering RoMH 
• Group exercise and feedback from the working groups. 
12.45-13.45 –Lunch break 
Session III – Identification of Major Accident Hazards, Chair: Stefano Tarantola  
13.45-15.45 – Major Hazard identification and Risk Assessment (M. Konstantinidou) 
• Methods and tools for major hazard identification, and risk assessment principles and methodologies; 
• Presentation of a case study; 
• Group exercise and feedback from the working groups. 
15.45-16.00 – Coffee/tea break and feedback from groups 
Session IV – Equipment and Arrangements, Chair: Stefano Tarantola (EC – JRC) 
16.00-18.00 – Equipment and Arrangements (S. Walker) 
• Assessment of the “Equipment and Arrangements” section of a RoMH; 
• Assessment of RoMH sections on: a) Fire and Explosion, b) Well control, and c) Containment of hazardous 
substances; 
• Group exercise to consider a RoMH Case Study, followed by feedback from the working groups. 
18:00 – End of the 1
st
 Day 
Day 2 - 14
th
 October 2016, JRC Ispra, Italy 
Session I – Emergency Response, Chair: Shlomo Wald (EC – JRC) 
08.45-08.50 – Recap session 
08.50-10.40 – Emergency Response (S. Walker) 
• Assessment of RoMH requirements relating to EER, including the internal ERP and the protection of workers; 
• Group exercise to consider a RoMH Case Study, followed by feedback from the working groups. 
10.40-10.55 - Coffee/tea break 
Session II – Assessment of Environmental Issues, Chair: Shlomo Wald (EC – JRC) 
10.55-12.30 – Emergency Response: Environmental Aspects (M. Konstantinidou, S. Walker) 
• Assessment of environmental aspects during emergency response and the EIA; 
• RoMH requirements in relation to environmental protection; 
• Group exercise to consider a RoMH Case Study, followed by feedback from the working groups. 
12.30-13.30 –Lunch break 
Session III – RoMH Management Arrangements, Chair: Stefano Tarantola (EC – JRC) 
13.30-15.00 – Safety and Environmental Management Systems (S. Walker) 
• Assessment of safety and environmental management systems; 
• Safety and Environmental Critical Elements and Verification schemes; 
• Group exercise to consider a RoMH Case Study, followed by feedback from the working groups. 
Session IV – After the assessment, Chair: Stefano Tarantola (EC – JRC) 
15.00-15.30 – Post acceptance issues (S. Walker) 
• How to handle notifications, including those for combined operations & material change; 
• Activities to be undertaken by the Competent Authority after the acceptance of a RoMH. 
15.30-16.00 – The way forward – Action plan  
16:00-16.15 – Wrap up, conclusions 
16.15 – End of the Training course 
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Annex 2 - Checklist on the content of a Report on Major Hazards 
 
PRELIMINARY INFORMATION* 
Type of document:   Report on Major Hazards  Amended Report on Major Hazards*** 
Date of last review / update 
(if applicable) 
  __ / __ / ____ 
Type of installation:  Production installation  Non-production installation 
Status of installation:  New/Planned  Existing 
Name of the installation:  
Installation connected with other installations and/or connected infrastructure:  Yes          No 
Notifications submitted prior to the 
RoMH: 
 Design Notification  Relocation notification 
 Not required  
*To clearly define the context of the RoMH. 
 
Note: 
 This checklist has been drafted only for completeness check purposes, to help participants in the identification of the information which should be contained 
in a Report on Major Hazards, according to Directive 2013/30/EU. 
 This document is not an assessment checklist. 
 The list of information may not be exhaustive and its use is not an official EU requirement. 
 
Note:  
 Some of the descriptions to be required according to this checklist might somehow overlap. The purpose of the checklist, however, is to spot any missing 
information as required by Directive 2013/30/EU. 
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SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
DOES THE REPORT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (AS PER DIRECTIVE 
2013/30/EU)? 
CORRESPONDING SECTION(S) IN THE 
ANALYSED DOCUMENT 
IS IT EXHAUSTIVE? MISSING / INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
(TO BE ASKED AS INTEGRATION (ART. 12(4)) 
 Name of the Operator (For production installations only) E.g. Chapter 1.5  Yes     No 
(if section is considered not 
exhaustive) 
 Name of the Owner (For non-production installations only)   Yes     No  
 Address of the Operator (For production installations only)   Yes     No  
 Address of the Owner (For non-production installations only)   Yes     No  
 
Description of account taken of the CA response to the design / 
relocation notification (For production installations only)  
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of the installation (including means of transfer and 
stationing – in case of non-production installations) 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of any association of the installations with other 
installations or connected infrastructure (including wells) (For 
production installations only) 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Summary of workers involvement in the preparation of the 
Report on Major Hazards 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Reference to the relevant codes, standards and guidance used 
in the construction and commissioning of the installation   
 
 Yes     No 
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SECTION B. MAJOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & ASSESSMENT 
 
DOES THE REPORT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (AS PER DIRECTIVE 
2013/30/EU)? 
CORRESPONDING SECTION(S) IN THE 
ANALYSED DOCUMENT 
IS IT EXHAUSTIVE? 
MISSING / INCOMPLETE INFORMATION (TO BE 
ASKED AS INTEGRATION (ART. 12(4)) 
 Demonstration that all major hazards have been identified E.g. Chapter 1.5  Yes     No 
(if section is considered not 
exhaustive) 
 
Demonstration of major hazards likelihood and consequence 
assessment (taking into account also any environmental, 
meteorological, seabed limitations on safe operations) 
  Yes     No 
 
 
Description of all types of operations with major hazard 
potential to be carried out on the installation (including the 
maximum number of PoB the installation at any time) 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Demonstration of suitability of MAH control measures and 
safety and environmental critical elements in place to reduce the 
risk of a major accident to an acceptable level 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 Assessment of Oil spill response effectiveness    Yes     No  
 
Demonstration of the identification of all major hazards for all 
operations the installation is capable of performing (for non-
production installations) 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Demonstration that the risk of a major accident is reduced to an 
acceptable level – refer to point above (for non-production 
installations) 
 
 Yes     No 
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SECTION C. DESCRIPTION OF CONTROL MEASURES 
 
DOES THE REPORT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (AS PER DIRECTIVE 
2013/30/EU)? 
CORRESPONDING SECTION(S) IN THE 
ANALYSED DOCUMENT 
IS IT EXHAUSTIVE? 
MISSING / INCOMPLETE INFORMATION (TO BE 
ASKED AS INTEGRATION (ART. 12(4)) 
DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT AND ARRANGEMENTS: 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure well 
control 
E.g. Chapter 1.5  Yes     No 
(if section is considered not 
exhaustive) 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure process 
safety 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure fire & 
explosion prevention 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure 
containment of – and protection of workers from - hazardous 
substances 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to ensure 
protection of the environment from an incipient major accident 
 
 Yes     No 
 
DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONS/WORKERS: 
 
Description of equipment and arrangements to protect persons 
on the installation from major hazards 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of arrangements to ensure safe escape of persons on 
the installation 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of arrangements to ensure safe evacuation and 
rescue of persons on the installation 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
Description of arrangements for the maintenance of control 
systems in the event that all personnel are evacuated (to 
prevent damage to the installation and the environment) 
 
 Yes     No 
 
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: 
 
Adequate description of the Safety and Environmental 
Management System of the operator (all information relevant to 
production/non-production installations) 
 
 Yes     No 
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Annex 3 – Guidelines for Competent Authorities during the assessment of major hazard identification and risk assessment aspects of RoMHs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAJOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS IN THE RoMH 
Topics Some key assessment issues 
1. Overall compliance 
with the Directive 
 Taken as a whole, does the RoMH provide a clear demonstration that  a logical and appropriate process has been undertaken to: 
o  identify all the major hazards 
o assess the likelihood and consequences of those major hazards 
o ensure that the proposed control measures are suitable and reduce the risk of a major accident to an acceptable level  
2.  Hazard identification 
 Is the methodology for undertaking the hazard identification clear? 
 What overall guidelines or standards have been used?  Are they appropriate?  
 Which hazard identification techniques were used? Can the operator/owner justify why they have used these techniques? Are these 
appropriate? 
 What evidence is there that the hazard identification techniques been conducted professionally and correctly? Were the teams 
suitable and experienced, especially the leaders of HAZID and HAZOP exercises? 
 Has the workforce been effectively involved in the range of hazard identification exercises?  
 How did the operator/owner ensure that the hazard identification studies covered the whole range of operations likely on the 
installation?   
3.  Risk assessment  
 Is the whole process for establishing risk levels clear?  
 Is the overall approach appropriate for the size/complexity of the installation? (e.g. qualitative v semi-quantitative v QRA) 
 Is there a clear link between the hazard identification and the risk assessment? 
 Undertake a Competent Authority “reality check” - do the results of the risk assessment seem sensible? 
 If consultants were used to undertake this risk assessment work: 
o Does the scope of their work match the range of hazards on the installation? 
o Is there evidence that the operator/owner has provided the consultants with all appropriate information (for instance Piping 
& Instrumentation Diagrams, access to company specialists etc.)?  
o Is the consultant experienced in this type of work? Does he/she have the necessary knowledge for the installation involved? 
4.  Consequence 
estimation 
 Is the process for identifying the consequences of major hazards clear? 
 Is the range of detailed consequence/escalation studies appropriate for the hazards? 
 If consultants have undertaken such studies, consider same range of question as per risk assessment above 
5.  Control and 
mitigation measures 
 Is it clear how the major hazard control measures on the installation have been influenced by the hazard identification and risk 
assessment process? 
 Do any of the risk/consequence studies recommend additional controls to further reduce risk?  Have these recommendations been 
implemented, and if not, why?  
 How has the operator/owner demonstrated that the control measures have reduced the risk to an acceptable level?   
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At any point, if the process or the methodology used is not clear or completely rationale ask for details and clarifications.
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Annex 4 - CMAPP Checklist 
CMAPP CHECKLIST 
Does the Corporate Major Accident Prevention Policy contain explicitly written reference on the following aspects? YES NO Comments / Reference in 
the text 
(1) the responsibility at corporate board level for ensuring, on a continuous basis, that the corporate major accident 
prevention policy is suitable, implemented, and operating as intended; 
There should be an emphasis on the continuous nature of this responsibility, including arrangements for Board level 
monitoring of the effectiveness of the CMAPP, and for rectifying any shortfalls 
   
(2) measures for building and maintaining a strong safety culture with a high likelihood of continuous safe operation; 
For instance, effective consultation with the workforce, Board level support for initiatives, strong Board commitment, 
and overall safety leadership for major hazard management. 
   
(3) the extent and intensity of process auditing; 
The details of the broad corporate auditing process, should include issues such as periodicity, competence of auditing, 
how findings are reported and improvements tracked, role of Board in monitoring the company audit process 
(including when the Board is involved in significant concerns).  
   
(4) measures for rewarding and recognising desired behaviours; 
Measures to enhance motivation and safe behaviour should be described in this part. 
   
(5) the evaluation of the company’s capabilities and goals; 
This evaluation of the company’s capabilities and goals are with respect to major hazard control and management, 
and the need for periodic high level review.  
   
(6) measures for maintenance of safety and environmental protection standards as a corporate core value; 
The CMAPP should show how the Board understands the company’s safety/environmental standards/objectives, and 
how they are support and recognise this. 
   
(7) formal command and control systems that include board members and senior management of the company; 
For the purposes of the CMAPP, this should cover, at the minimum, how the Board maintains an oversight and 
involvement in operational activities which are relevant to the MH risks, so is not just restricted to major hazards 
incident response. 
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(8) the approach to competency at all levels of the company; 
This can reference out to any company-wide competency systems, but should include the Board’s approach to 
ensuring competency relevant to MH management and control, including contractors working on their installations 
and premises. 
   
(9) The extent to which particulars (1)-(8) are applied in the company’s offshore oil and gas operations conducted 
outside the Union. 
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Annex 5 - Assessment of Core SEMS Management procedures in the RoMH 
 
 
ASSESSMENT OF CORE SEMS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE RoMH 
 
Broad description Some key assessment issues 
1. Competency and Training 
1. Is the process for initial suitability and first employment clearly described?  Does it cover the following? 
 Selection 
 Pre-employment medical 
 Induction process 
 Basic offshore competencies such as survival training and emergency response actions 
2. How are safety critical tasks, and their competency requirements, identified? 
3. Are training matrices used?  Are they comprehensive?  
4. Are the training and competency requirements for specific operational roles, including emergency response staff, clearly 
defined?  Do these arise from a clear and comprehensive process? 
5. Is the competency assessment and record process well documented and adequate? 
6. Have human and organisational factors influenced the competency and training process?  How has that been done? 
2.  Control of Contractors, 
Procurement Management, and 
working with third parties 
1. Are the arrangements for the selection of contractors or companies who supply goods and services clear? Do they provide 
an adequate system for assessing safety critical issues such as quality control of supplied equipment, competence of staff, 
etc.? 
2.  Are contractor or vender personnel who work offshore included within the operator/owner SEMS?  How is this done? 
3.  If SIMOPS or combined operations are relevant to the installation: 
 are there comprehensive SIMOPS/combined operations procedures?   
 do those procedures include a review process to identify any additional or changed risks created by the 
combined operation, and their consequences? 
 is the bridging document process adequate? Does it provide evidence of the need to identify agreed 
management processes and clarity of decision making? Are the agreed working procedures for the combined 
operation clear (especially major hazard control procedures and decision-making)? Is there a summary of the 
proposed arrangements for coordinating the management systems of the two installations involved? 
3.  Management of Change 
1.  Is there a comprehensive description of Management of Change (MoC) process?  
2. Are the MoC procedures clear, with defined roles and responsibilities?  
3. Is it clear how (and by whom) the MoC procedures are triggered? 
4.  Does the MoC process involve an assessment of the hazard/risk of the proposed change? Is it adequate?  
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4.  Permit to Work system 
1.  Is the Permit to Work process well described? 
2.  What standards or guidelines is the process based on?   Are these appropriate? Do the isolation procedures follow 
recognised practise? 
2.  Is its scope sufficient for the installation? 
3. Are roles and responsivities clear? 
5.  Are training requirements identified? 
4.  Is there an effective management and review system for the PTW system? 
5.  Logistics 
1.  Does the RoMH describe comprehensive Helicopter Operations procedures/Manuals? Is there evidence that these meet 
industry/regulator guidelines? 
2.  Are there comprehensive helideck procedures, including allocation of roles, training (especially Helicopter Landing 
Officers), and covering both routine and emergency helicopter operations?  
3.  Are there comprehensive maintenance arrangements for the helideck and associated helicopter operations equipment 
4.  Have the activities of standby and supply vessels been assessed with respect to major hazards?  Are the results of such an 
assessment reflected in the support vessel arrangements?  
5.  Does the installation have a clear adverse weather procedure?  Are those arrangements and any weather limitations 
appropriate?  
6.  Independent Verification  
1. Are all the specific Directive requirements included in the description of the independent Verification Scheme,  
2.  Is there a clear, comprehensive summary of the Independent Verification system, linking out to more detailed documents 
(for separate, more detailed, assessment)? 
3.  Is the scope of verification activity (such as initial design and commissioning, during projects, delivering SECE 
performance testing etc.) reflected in the management arrangements? 
4.  Are roles and responsibilities for the verification systems detailed and adequate? 
5.  Is there clarity of how the SECEs and their performance standards are identified from the installation major hazard risk 
identification/assessment process? Is the approach systematic? 
6. Is the approach to identify the range, scope and periodicity of the verification activities, for both active and passive SECEs, 
clearly described? Are they appropriate?  
7.  Does the SEMS include details of how the results of the verification will be used?  Is there an escalation process when the 
verification findings cannot be resolved? How are the results of SECE performance testing monitored by senior 
management? 
8. Are the Annex V requirements for the selection of the independent verifier fulfilled?  
9.  If the installation is also a vessel, are the Verification and Classification activities well-coordinated?  
10.  Is the introduction of 3
rd
 party and contractor SECEs covered?  Are the proposals suitable? 
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7. Overall HS &E procedures 
1.  Is it clear how the overall health, safety and environmental protection will be managed, with clear expectations and roles 
throughout the management chain? 
2.  Is it clear how safe working practises will be developed and implemented? What are the pre-task arrangements – do they 
include task risk assessment? Tool box talks or other communication methods? Is the “Stop Job” process clear and 
established?   
3.  Are occupational health issues reflected in the HS&E management procedures?  Does this include such core issues as 
legionella, radioactive materials and H2S? What about PPE selection and training? 
4.  Are more detailed procedures available for further assessment if required?  
5.  Is the process of incorporating environmental protection management into H&SE systems/procedures clear? Are the spill 
and general waste management systems and procedures adequate? 
8.  Process for identifying and 
evaluating major hazards, and their 
likelihood/ and potential 
consequences 
1.  Are the processes for identifying and evaluating MH risk, and their consequences, clear? 
2.  Are environmental impact and consequence issues integrated into these procedures? 
3.  Is the process adequate and comprehensive? 
e.g. those involved, breadth of techniques used,  
4.  What quality checks are integrated into the risk assessment process? 
5.  How do the outcomes of this process link into the development of MH procedures and controls? 
9.  Other more specific procedures, 
such as: 
 emergency response 
 drilling and well control 
 process operations 
 marine operations 
 lifting operations 
 the maintenance process 
 continuing structural 
suitability 
 lifting operations 
 
1.   Assess whether the management systems are clear and adequate for the installation concerned. 
2.  Ascertain the standards or guidelines upon which the respective procedures have been developed. Are they suitable?  
3.  An assessment of both the management systems which support these procedures, and a detailed scrutiny of the 
procedures themselves, is appropriate for these broad topics (see previous sessions regarding emergency response and well 
control). 
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Annex 6 - Assessing Environmental Response 
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE ISSUES IN THE RoMH 
Broad Topics Some key assessment issues 
The management of 
the environmental 
response 
arrangements 
Are the command and control arrangements for an environmental emergency response clear?  Do these arrangements cover the following: 
 The identification of who is responsible for the initiation of the installation environmental response actions 
 Clarity of respective roles of the company’s offshore and onshore management 
 Clear statement of responsibility for notifying external emergency response arrangements, and on-going liaison on environmental 
response and containment issue 
o This would include any senior company representatives and/or technical specialists attending the External Emergency Response control 
centres 
Emergency Response 
Contractors 
 Is the activation process for mobilising environmental response contractors (e.g. vessels to deploy booms and skimmers and contractors 
to clean beaches) clear and comprehensive? 
 How are those contractors to be coordinated? 
 Is there a demonstration that the environmental response contractors have the capacity and capability to undertake this work? What is 
the time necessary to deploy these contractors?  Is that time suitable, bearing in mind the anticipated modelling of the spill 
development? 
 If the oil spill modelling indicates that beaching of the oil is a possibility, is the mobilisation time for the beach response contractor 
adequate to provide an effective response to minimise the impact of oil pollution? 
Oil spill response 
equipment 
 Is there an inventory of the oil spill response equipment? 
 Is the ownership and storage location of this equipment clearly stated? 
 What are the arrangements for ensuring that the equipment is maintained in an operable condition? 
 What are the arrangements for transporting oil spill response equipment to the deployment location?  Would they be sufficient in the 
case of a foreseeable oil spill? 
 What are the arrangements for ensuring that the procedures for using the oil spill response equipment are maintained in an operable 
condition? 
Use of Dispersants 
 What is the evidence that any available dispersants been assessed or approved to minimise the risk of long term environmental damage 
or to the food chain 
 How has the dispersant been chosen to reflect the possible oil types that could be released? Have any limits to the dispersant efficacy 
been identified, and if so what are the consequences?  
Training  Are the arrangements for training those involved in environmental emergency response adequate? 
 Are the requirements for environmental response drills and exercises (including “desk top” exercises) clear? 
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Environmental 
response strategies 
 Does the Internal Environmental Response Plan clearly describe the range of response strategies which should be adopted?  
 Do those strategies include adequate details of 
o Dispersants; 
o Containment (booms) 
o Recovery (mechanical skimming etc.) 
o Monitoring and surveillance (including aircraft and satellite) 
o Where appropriate, controlling the well source via subsea isolation, well capping, well kill, or relief well drilling 
 To aid environmental response, how will any oil spill volumes be calculated? What access does the operator/owner have to real-
time oil spill modelling in the event of a release to sea? Are these arrangements satisfactory? 
Capping devices 
 Does the RoMH identify whether the use of well capping devices is appropriate? 
 If so, what is the procedure for assessing what type of capping device is required, and whether it would be compatible to the well 
infrastructure and anticipated well pressures? 
 What is the anticipated time from mobilising the well capping device to finally successfully capping well?  Which contractor would 
be doing this?  
Relief Wells 
 How is the need for a relief well considered? 
 If a relief well is to be an option (following a specific well notification), what are the requirements, and what is an estimate of the 
time needed to complete the relief well operation (from the day the relief well operation is mobilised to the actual well kill via the 
relief well) 
 If a relief well is an option, what is the availably of a suitable drilling rig during the period of the well operation? What pre-contract 
arrangements are in place for securing the relief well rig?  
Knowledge of any 
particular 
environmental 
sensibilities 
 Does the RoMH contain an assessment of the potential overall environmental effects of a spill? 
 Are any specific environmental sensitivities stated in the RoMH or ERP?  How are they factored into the environmental emergency 
response plan? 
Effectiveness of oil 
spill response 
 Is there an analysis of the likely effectiveness of the oil spill response? 
 Does the analysis include considerations of  
o Weather (wind, visibility, rain/snow, ad temperature) 
o Sea states, including tides and currents 
o Hours of daylight  
o Presence of ice and debris 
o And other known environmental conditions which could affect the effectiveness of the response 
Link to External 
Emergency Response 
Plans 
 Does the RoMH adequately describe how the operator/owner’s internal response procedures for environmental response link to 
any relevant wider External Emergency Response Plans?  
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Annex 7 - Assessing Combined Operations Notifications 
ASSESSING COMBINED OPERATIONS NOTIFICATIONS 
Some practical issues 
1.  From an initial quick scrutiny, ensure that the original combined operations notification provides all the 
information required by the Directive, including: 
 A clear agreement that all the parties in the combined operation agree with the contents of the 
notification 
 A clear description of the actual operation, and the programme for this work 
 Description of any equipment which is to be used in the combined operation and which is not 
described in the current RoMHs for either installation 
 A bridging document, authorised by all the parties, which sets out how the management systems of 
the two installations will be coordinated 
 A summary of the risk assessment, including specifically: 
a) A description of any operation during the combined operations programme which has the 
potential to cause a major accident 
b) A description of any risk control measures which are introduced as a result of the risk 
assessment 
If the notification does not cover all these specific issues (and any other issues specifically required by your 
own legislation), return the notification and “re-set” the deadline for your CA response. 
2.  Remember that the combined operations notification is in addition to the normal RoMH arrangements 
for the two installations involved.  Therefore, the scrutiny of the combined operations notification should 
focus on the interactions between the two installations, issues over and above the individual RoMHs. 
However, the RoMHs for the two installations involved (which will have already been accepted by your CA) 
will be essential reference documents during this work.  The notification supplements the generic 
combined operation arrangements of the RoMH. 
3.  A large percentage of combined operations will also involve a well operations notification.  Ensure your 
scrutiny system of the two linked notifications is well coordinated, with good communication between the 
two teams to ensure each is aware of emerging issues and progress of the others’ scrutiny. In particular, 
some of the technical detail about the well operation will be essential background for the scrutiny of the 
combined operation notification (e.g. whether the well is HPHT, likely presence of H2S, the identification of 
any meteorological or seabed limitations, the extent of the well programme itself etc.).    
4.  Key areas for assessment of the combined operations notification include:  
Risk assessment 
a) What is the quality and thoroughness of the risk assessment work done for the combined 
operation programme? Has a systematic approach been adopted to assess the risk impact of the 
joint operation? Does the risk assessment cover the whole life cycle of the combined operations? 
This is not just a re-run of the risk assessments undertaken within the respective RoMHs, but will 
include the identification of the additional risks (or increases to existing risks) that the combined 
operation will cause to either installation.  
b) Have site specific issues been taken into account during the risk assessment and the selection of 
controls?  Examples could include structural loadings (such as loading from additional temporary 
equipment or the interaction of MODU spud cans on installation piles or subsea furniture), any 
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restrictions during the combined operation (such as vulnerable topside structures or sea state 
limits), and increase in marine activity (e.g. anchor handling operations) 
 
Management arrangements 
a) Are the anticipated management arrangements for combined operations, as laid down in the 
respective RoMHs, being followed?  If not, why not and what are the consequences? 
b) How was the bridging document arrived at?  Was it the result of a formal GAP analysis of the SEMS 
and procedures between the two installations, or does it just follow a “standard” format10? Is it 
comprehensive? 
c) When the combined operations concerns well operations, is it is absolutely clear whose well 
control manual take precedence?  Is this liable to cause competency problems on either 
installation?  
d) Are the overall decision, command and control arrangements described, and appropriate? 
e) Have the interface arrangements been tested before the combined operation commences? For 
instance, a Drilling the Well on Paper exercise (DWOP) is a common practise to test interface 
arrangements prior to a combined operations starting. 
f) How are third party contractors included in the interfacing arrangements? 
g) What is the induction process for staff/contractors working on the other’s installation? 
 
Emergency response 
a) Has the need for any changes in the emergency response arrangements been considered? Is 
the layout, availability and capacity of emergency evacuation and escape still appropriate for 
the two installations working in combination?  Are any of the existing escape routes or 
equipment compromised? Has any increase in the numbers on board been taken into account?  
b) Has the internal emergency response plans of both installations been assessed and amended to 
take into account the combined operation?   Has that of the non-production installation been 
submitted with the combined operations notification? Have the oil spill response/effectiveness 
of both installations been updated to take into account the specific nature of the combined 
operations? 
                                                          
10 There has been pressure from industry to use more standard templates for bridging documents.  
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Annex 8 – Case Study: Equipment and Arrangements  
 
REGAL DRILLING INC. 
 RoMH for “DRILL KING” MODU. 
 
3. DRILLING & WELL CONTROL 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
3.1.1 The Drill King rig is a deep water drilling semi-submersible rig of the Yutson class, built by Yutson 
Shipbuilders of South Korea in 1990.  It is capable of 30,000 ft. drilling depth and operation in 7,000 ft. 
water depth. It has a standard drill floor layout and equipment, similar to all other rigs of the Yutson class, 
with rotary table etc., and the Driller’s cabin overlooks the drill floor.   
 
3.1.2 All drilling equipment on the Drill King described complies with the MODU Code, Class Rules and the 
relevant API codes. It is approved by the Classification Society.  The equipment is maintained and tested by 
Regal Drilling through the rig’s planned maintenance process, with third party inspections and tests 
occasionally requested by Regal Drilling as appropriate.  
 
  
3.2. Hoisting & Pipe-handling  
 
3.2 .1 The derrick is a conventional type, with a free lifting height of 150ft. Hook load capacity of 1,250,000 
lb., and the associated equipment includes 330 stands (300,000 ft.) of drill pipe. The pipe handling systems 
are able to handle both vertical and horizontal tubulars, using the two 85t hydraulic boom cranes adjacent 
to the drill floor.   
 
3.2.2 The derrick has a hydraulic stabbing basket installed in the derrick. All functions, including emergency, 
are controlled from the basket, which also has an escape line for emergency escape. A remote control 
panel for the basket is on the drill floor. The stabbing basket has a 225 kg safe working load. In addition, 
two dedicated man-rider winches are provided, one port and one starboard side of the drill floor. Two 
man-rider winches are also provided, one forward and one aft, on the BOP deck.  A training matrix is 
available for the rig which indicates those personnel, in addition to the Crane Operators, that have received 
training in the lifting related courses such as Man Riding Operations, Working at Heights, and Rigging. 
 
3.2.3 An iron roughneck “Hydra Tong MPT 200” is installed on the drill floor, and is a safer method of 
handling drill pipe than manual tongs.  The iron roughneck is designed to spin in/torque up and brake 
out/spin out tubulars from 3 ½” to 9 ¾ “diameter, and casing up to 25” diameter. The Hydra Tong system 
consists of a travelling elevation frame onto which the specific tool frames for handling different sizes of 
tubular can be hung. The tool frames are brought to and from the Hydra Tong MPT using winches. The 
Hydra Tong MPT travels to and from the well centre on rails. All functions are electro/hydraulic remotely 
operated, controlled from the drill-floor electronic operating system. Two hydraulic catheads are used to 
provide a line pull for the rig tongs. The hydraulic catheads are remotely operated, but can also be 
operated from the local control panel on drill floor. 
 
3.2.3 Drill King has a Majestic 60-50 rotary table which has a light opening of 60” (with adapter bushing 60” 
to 49.5”). The rotary table is equipped with hydraulic drive motors (not for drilling) with sufficient capacity 
to rotate the drill string slowly during pipe connections. It is operated from the Driller’s cabin.   
  
Static Load Rating: 1,100 tonnes  
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Max. Recommended Table Speed: 140 rpm  
Max. Torque at 100 rpm: 77.3 kNm   
 
The table drive motors are powered via a hydraulic fluid ring main line energised via the    HPU which 
supplies hydraulic fluid at 207 bar. The HPU includes four pumps, with pump displacement regulated by a 
hydraulic pressure control valve. The high pressure sides of the pumps are equipped with individual 
pressure relief valves to limit maximum running pressure of the pumps. The pumps are separated by a 
check valve to ensure back up in case of a pump failure. The HPU is fitted with an effective cooling and 
filtration system. The hydraulic oil reservoir is fitted with a heater.  
 
3.2.4 The marine riser tensioning system is installed to keep positive tension in the marine riser and 
compensates for the heave (vertical relative motion) between the riser and the rig during drilling. The 
WRTS has a maximum tension capacity of 2,000,000lbs with a compensating stroke of 19.05m – four times 
the cylinder stroke. The WRTS controls the tension in the riser by means of six dual wireline tensioners, 
installed in diametrically opposed pairs around the riser, outside the derrick at drill floor level. The riser is 
suspended by support wires that are routed from the riser support ring to the tension cylinders via idler 
sheaves. The cylinders have wire sheaves at both ends and the wires are reeved around the cylinder 
sheaves to give a 4:1 mechanical advantage. The cylinder end of each wire is terminated in a wire anchor. 
Each riser tensioner is fitted with one high pressure and one low pressure accumulator. The riser 
tensioners maintain tension in the wire ropes by taking up or paying out rope in response to rig motion. As 
downward heave of the rig tends to cause a decrease in rope tension, the hydraulic pressure in the cylinder 
causes the cylinder to extend to maintain the selected rope tension. HP air is supplied from the APV’s to 
the high-pressure accumulator to maintain hydraulic pressure in the tensioner cylinder.. As upward heave 
of the rig tends to cause an increase in rope tension, the cylinder retracts, increasing the length of wire 
rope, to maintain the selected rope tension. When the cylinder retracts, fluid in the tensioner cylinder 
passes through the riser anti-recoil valve into the fluid side of the high-pressure accumulator and air in the 
accumulator will be compressed into the APV’s. The WRTS includes an air valve control skid 24 x working 
APV’s, 6 x standby APV’s, a control cabinet with the PLC, and a local operating panel. The WRTS can be 
operated by controls in Driller’s cabin or from a local panel.  
 
3.3. Mud & Cement System  
 
3.3.1 There are eight pressure bulk silos on the rig for bulk storage of barite, bentonite and cement. Two 
cylindrical tanks (P-tanks) are installed in each of the large diameter columns extending through the decks 
3 to 5. Two additional tanks can be used for displacing riser mud volume or as excess mud storage. There 
are two pill tanks and a slug tank, which are used for mixing pre-trip slugs and/or premixes. Each mud pit is 
filled/circulated via three centrifugal mixing/ transfer pumps and two mixing hoppers. The drilling fluid 
(mud) is pumped from the active mud pit by the main mud pumps, situated forward of mud pits. These 
pumps are pre-charged by mud charge pumps on the low pressure side.  
 
 
3.3.2 The mud system is operated and monitored, when drilling, locally in the Shaker Room and the Mud 
Pump Room. It is also controlled remotely from the Driller’s cabin by the Driller. The system is additionally 
monitored in the mud logging unit. The key safety aspects of the mud system on the rig is: - 
 All high-pressure mud lines and manifolds have thickness check surveys carried out on a periodic 
basis. This is included in the rig’s Planned Maintenance System, and reviewed by a third party 
(DNV). 
 The safety relief valves are tested and re-dressed as necessary by an authorised company. All 
valves and sensors on the mud pump, rig floor manifolds and top drive are pressure tested on a 
regular basis either to 300 psi low and 7,500 psi high, or according to operator requirements. All 
the above is part of the rig’s Planned Maintenance System.  
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3.3.3 During normal drilling operations sufficient stocks of barite etc. are maintained to effect well control 
operations. The company guidelines for minimum Barite stock levels are below:-  
 
Minimum Stock of Barite  - Tonnes  
Mud Wt  Gradient  Volume of Total Active 
System (BBLS)  
ppg  psi/ft  1000  1500  2000  2500  
8.0  0.416  53  80  107  133  
8.5  0.442  54  82  109  136  
9.0  0.468  56  83  111  139  
9.5  0.494  57  85  114  142  
10.0  0.520  58  87  116  145  
10.5  0.546  59  89  119  148  
11.0  0.572  61  91  121  152  
11.5  0.598  62  93  124  155  
12.0  0.624  64  95  127  159  
12.5  0.650  65  98  130  163  
13.0  0.676  67  100  133  167  
13.5  0.702  68  103  137  171  
14.0  0.728  70  105  140  176  
14.5  0.754  72  108  144  180  
15.0  0.780  74  111  148  185  
15.5  0.806  76  114  153  191  
16.0  0.832  78  118  157  196 
 
 
3.4. BOP Systems  
 
3.4.1 The BOP is designed to be able to close off the wellbore or around tubular and to provide means of 
holding and circulating pressures up to 15,000 psi. It is designed and maintained to API standards.  Should 
the BOP be used for HP/HT service, relevant BOP components would be upgraded with elastomeric 
compounds. 
 
3.4.2 The BOP overhead crane is designed as a conventional gantry crane, running port/starboard. The 
crane is equipped with two fixed main winches of 145t SWL each (N.B. winches rated by manufacturer’s at 
155t each but overload test carried out to 145t SWL), designed for lifting the BOP stack. The main winch 
hook blocks are each terminated with a single lifting pin designed specifically to interface with lifting pad-
eyes incorporated within the BOP stack frame. The crane is also equipped with two travelling auxiliary 
winches, each of 30t SWL, used for various maintenance and operational procedures. The auxiliary winches 
are mounted on the port and starboard edges of the main beam and travelling in the forward/aft direction. 
The two main winches and the two auxiliary winches are driven by hydraulically powered (variable speed) 
gear units. Hydraulic power is supplied from the high pressure rig hydraulic ring line.  
 
3.4.3   The Cameron BOP stack has flexible arrangements for its configuration, depending upon client 
preferences and the reservoir characteristics.  Regel Drilling prefers to use a combination of an annular 
preventer, blind and casing sheer rams variable bore pipe rams, along with a Vetco wellhead connecter. 
The annular BOP is hydraulically operated and will close and seal off on drillpipe, tool joints, tubing, casing, 
or wireline in the wellbore or completely seal off the open hole to full rated pressure. 
 
.  
3.4.4   The Drill King BOP is fitted with a BOP and LMRP Control System capable of operating in water 
depths up to 6000 ft. The system is supplied with two subsea control pods (yellow and blue) and either pod 
can control the subsea BOP, LMRP and associated subsea ancillary equipment. Subsea control components 
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are duplicated to provide redundancy. The control pod contains hydraulic control valves which, on 
command from the surface (from either the driller and toolpusher panels), direct the flow of hydraulic 
power fluid to and from the blowout preventers, hydraulic connectors and valves, etc. The ROV panels on 
the lower stack and LMRP will be updated in Q1 2017. The rig is also fitted with a Deadman Auto shear 
system.  
 
3.4.5 A diverter system is installed for safe venting any shallow formation gas encountered in top hole 
drilling and any gas accumulation in the marine riser. The diverter functions are hydraulically actuated and 
operated remotely from the driller’s and toolpusher’s panels. The pressure rating is 500 psi although the 
diverter system is not designed as a pressure retaining system but rather for flow diversion. The diverter 
has connections for one diverter line, one flow line, one fill up line and hydraulic control lines.  
 
3.4.6 The choke and kill system is used to depressurise well influxes during circulation of the well bore by 
routing to the poor boy degasser or overboard to opposite sides of the rig. The choke and kill lines are an 
integral part of the blow out prevention equipment required for drilling well control. The choke and kill 
manifold has a rated working pressure of 12,000 psi and has two manual and two remotely operated 
chokes. The remotely operated chokes are controlled from the Driller’s cabin and from the local control 
panel close to the choke and kill manifold on the drill floor. The kill line provides a means of pumping fluid 
into the well bore when normal circulation through the drill string cannot be employed. The choke line 
connected to the manifold provides a means of applying back pressure on the formation while circulating 
out formation fluids influx into the well bore following a "kick" which is an entry of water, gas, oil or other 
formation fluid into the well bore resulting from insufficient pressure from the drilling fluid column to 
overcome the pressure exerted by the well formation. Failure to control a "kick" would result in a "blow 
out” or uncontrolled release of formation fluids or gases.  
 
3.4.7 The BOP and all its components are maintained to pressure tested to clients’ requirements on a 
regular basis. Pressure tests, for example, would be carried out following casing runs. All rams, annular 
preventers and valves are individually tested to the required test pressure using the cementing unit. At the 
end of each well, the BOP is inspected for damage, and subsequently tested.  
 
3.4.8 Normal well operations are managed as indicated in the Organisation Chart, and all drilling operations 
are carried out according to Regal Drilling well control procedures. 
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Annex 9 – Case Study: Emergency Response – Safety Aspects  
 
REGAL DRILLING INC. 
 RoMH for “DRILL KING” MODU. 
 
7.1 GENERAL 
7.1.1 Guidance regarding to the emergency response on Drill King includes: 
• The Emergency Response Plan (ERP); 
• Station Bill; 
• Drill King Operations Manual. 
The Offshore Installation Manager’s (OIM) is the person in charge of the Drill King, and has a duty to 
ensure that all personnel are aware of and comply with the procedures documented within the ERP.  As 
such, every person new to the Drill King undergoes an orientation tour as part of the induction process 
which, amongst other things, explains where to find the Station Bill and other information regarding 
emergency response. The induction process is supported by a 30 minute video on actions for all general 
personnel to take upon the operation of the Drill King General Alarm, and formal “Muster Station” drills 
are held weekly.  
7.1.2 In order to ensure appropriate arrangements for evacuation, escape, recovery and rescue, the 
following have been considered: 
 all foreseeable major accident scenarios which may require evacuation, escape and rescue 
from the Drill King and an assessment of the likelihood of them occurring; 
 the arrangements which would be available in the event of a major accident requiring 
evacuation, escape and rescue from the Drill King; 
 the performance of the arrangements in the event of a major accident, taking into account 
factors which might affect their performance; 
 the availability of the following: 
o escape routes from each working area such that, in the event of an accident 
scenario, persons not immediately affected can make their way to the Temporary 
Refuge (TR), and respective muster areas; 
o a TR from which safe and complete evacuation and rescue can be planned and 
carried out; 
o embarkation, evacuation and rescue capability which will have a high level of 
availability taking into account environmental conditions. 
7.1.3 The Drill King emergency response procedures are under continuous review as a result of 
safety/environmental meetings, weekly drills and audits.  
7.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
7.2.1 The Drill King evacuation arrangements include: 
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7.2.2 Performance standards for each of the above elements have been set in accordance with the 
management system requirements relating to managing risk. Full details are in the ERP. 
7.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN 
7.3.1 The Drill King Emergency Response Plan (ERP) contains the details of the planned response to an 
emergency.  The ERP provides the general guidelines to be followed in the event of the occurrence of an 
incident with the potential to endanger life, property or the environment. Actions to be taken are also 
detailed on the MODU’s Station Bill, copies of which are posted conspicuously around the MODU. 
7.3.2 The ERP provides guidance to the OIM and MODU crew about the arrangements that should come 
into effect and the procedures to be followed by the appropriate personnel in the event an emergency 
occurs on the MODU.  The ERP contains: 
 
7.3.3 In addition, the overall process of dealing with emergencies is presented in flow charts that have 
been used as a basis for developing a suite of the emergency procedures.  The flowcharts are based on 
the following scenarios, which have all been identified through the Drill King major accident 
identification process, including: 
 
 escape routes from work stations to muster areas 
 primary and secondary muster areas and temporary refuge 
 areas used for refuge temporarily 
 protected routes from muster/temporary refuge areas to embarkation points 
 embarkation points 
 evacuation and escape equipment. 
 organisation details 
 roles and responsibilities 
 communication arrangements 
 emergency signals and drills 
 contact details 
 reporting requirements. 
 fire/explosion 
 collision 
 flooding and damage control 
 helicopter crash on Drill King 
 helicopter crash near Drill King 
 search and rescue 
 evacuation/abandon ship 
 lack of well control, or conditions which could lead to such 
 H2S 
 ballast emergency 
 structural failure 
 heavy weather 
 hull leakage 
 responding to oil spill to sea. 
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7.3.4 The flow charts illustrate the overall process for dealing with emergencies including an outline of 
the procedures associated with responding to initiating events with the potential to escalate into a major 
accident. 
7.4 COMMAND AND SUPPORT 
7.4.1 The key areas of responsibility for handling emergency situations on-board the Drill King depends on: 
 
7.4.2 The tasks these persons perform are drilled regularly so that in the event of a real emergency these 
basic duties for the safeguard of the MODU are carried out quickly and efficiently to avoid any delay in 
reacting to the emergency or going to their respective muster stations. 
7.4.3 In the event of an emergency situation, when the alarm has been sounded, the radio room become 
the Drill King’s emergency control centre (ECC) for handling the incident. In all cases, the OIM takes overall 
charge of the incident from there. 
7.4.3 When the general alarm (GA) is sounded, the following general rules apply to everyone on -board the 
MODU: 
 
7.4.4 The alarm status is indicated by alarm sounders throughout the Drill King, with additional flashing 
lights in high noise level areas. An alarm state may also be announced through use of the Public Address 
(PA) system. The various alarm signals are shown on the Station Bill. The location and description of the 
alarm and communication systems provided on the Drill King are detailed in RoMH Section 4.5.2. 
7.4.5 As soon as the EEC has been mobilized, the OIM will authorise appropriate alarm signals, if they have 
not been previously activated.  The OIM will: 
1. make announcements using the PA system, giving the nature of the emergency and any relevant 
instructions such as the redirection of personnel to secondary mustering points, should the nature 
of the incident deem this necessary.  
2. ensure that the emergency response and rescue vessel (ERRV) – if one is available - is advised of the 
situation and instructed to take up a position upwind of the MODU, with the crew on standby 
awaiting further instructions. 
3. instruct the Radio Operator to notify the onshore ERO in order that the onshore Incident 
Coordination Team (see 7.5) can be mobilised. For any situation which merits the mustering of POB 
on board Drill King, the Coastguard should be notified directly with further periodic updates. 
 the OIM, who is in overall command and directs and controls the operations 
 personnel with specific emergency duties which includes all regular personnel on 
duty at the time of the emergency, as well as some off-duty personnel 
 other persons, which includes off-duty regular personnel (unless given on-call 
emergency duties), visitors, casual contractors and all others without a specified 
emergency role. 
 stop all work 
 ensure equipment is secured 
 ensure the work site is made as safe as reasonably practicable 
 no smoking or naked lights anywhere 
 report to their designated muster points, unless otherwise directed by PA 
announcements. 
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7.4.6 During the initial response to the sounding of the GA, specified Drill King personnel will execute their 
assigned duties required to secure the MODU and muster at the appropriate location. Those Drill King 
personnel with specific roles to play in executing a particular procedure are given instruction on their duties 
on the sounding of the GA. Conformity with these duties will be tested by drills. 
7.4.7 Remaining personnel will report to the primary muster stations or as redirected by the OIM to 
secondary locations, depending on the level of impairment, if any, of the primary areas.  
7.4.8 The OIM will execute each stage of the emergency procedure as the situation develops. Account is 
taken of external factors such as weather conditions, proximity of other platforms and installations, 
helicopter availability and proximity of shipping. The combination of these external factors, in addition to 
the development of the situation on the MODU, affects the OIM's decision. This simple and consistent 
approach to the initial response provides the OIM with a quick and effective overview of the immediate 
impact of the emergency on POB allows resources to be allocated, in an efficient manner, to the task of 
responding to the incident. 
7.4.9 The OIM will instruct the maintenance personnel to isolate all electrical units that are not required in 
controlling the situation. It may be necessary to shut down the main engines and revert to the emergency 
generator. 
7.4.10 In an emergency situation the following chain of command is in place in the event that one or even 
two of the MODU's senior supervisory staff become incapacitated as a result of the emergency: 
 OIM(Day) 
 Senior Toolpusher(Night)  
 Toolpusher. 
 
During any emergency, it may well be prudent to reduce the manning level to the minimum possible. The 
table below designates ‘essential personnel’ on the Drill King. This list of essential personnel may vary at 
the sole discretion of the OIM, as dictated by the emergency situation. 
Essential Personnel  Optional Essential Personnel 
OIM Operator’s Representative 
Barge Engineer Driller 
Senior Toolpusher Derrickman 
Radio Operator Toolpusher 
Medic Mud Engineer 
Crane Operator Cementer 
Electrician Assistant Driller 
 
7.5 ONSHORE INCIDENT COORDINATION TEAM 
7.5.1 Regal Drilling Inc.’s onshore Incident Coordination Team (ICT) for incidents in European waters is 
based in Stavanger, Norway.  Its function is to co- ordinate back-up services for the Drill King, with the 
extent of its involvement dependent on the extent and seriousness of the situation.  The ICT will try to 
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relieve the OIM and Radio Operator on the Drill King from as many dealings with external bodies and 
authorities as possible. However, if the incident requires immediate assistance, then coastguard and other 
rescue services will be contacted directly from the Drill King in the first instance before the Drill King makes 
contact with the ICT. 
7.5.2 To initiate the Regal Drilling Inc. ICT, the Drill King OIM will contact the 24-hour on-call Regal Drilling 
Inc. Emergency Response Operator, who will assemble the ICT and start-up the Regal Drilling Inc. 
Emergency Response Centre (ERC)  in Ognedal Buildings, Stavanger.  The ICT will respond to a call-out in 
accordance with the instructions, guidelines and check-lists contained in the Regal Drilling ICT Manual.   
7.5.3 The ICT will consist of the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regal Drilling Inc. Duty Drilling Manager; 
 Emergency Response Coordinator; 
 HSEQ Coordinator; 
 Drill King onshore Rig Manager; 
 HR Duty Manager; 
 Regal Drilling Media Relations Duty Manager.  
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Annex 10 – Case Study: Verification  
EXTRACT FROM PRODUCTION PRINCESS FPSO RoMH - Section 5.4 Verification 
 
5.4.1 Any safety and environmental critical system/equipment on-board the Production Princess will be 
subject to independent verification.  The Production Princess is also subject to routine surveys under the 
class rules of our classification society, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). These survey requirements are 
complementary to the verification scheme, but do not duplicate it. 
 
5.4.2 The verification scheme incorporates the following: 
‘safety and environmental critical elements’ which are considered to be systems and equipment which is 
intended to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident, and whose failure could cause or contribute 
substantially to a major accident. 
 
Performance standards for those systems/equipment 
 
5.4.3 The Production Princess’s verification scheme was developed in-house. This process identified what 
are considered to be the safety and environmental critical elements on board, and then decided on the 
achievable performance standards for those elements. The Table below lists all the SECEs, grouped into 
broad processes: 
 
SECE System List of SECEs 
 Fire and Gas Detection 1. Fire detection systems 
2. Gas detection systems 
Active Fire Protection  3. Deluge systems 
4. Sprinkler systems 
5. Fixed fire-fighting system in engine room 
6. Portable fire-fighting equipment 
 Passive Fire Protection 7. Process vessel passive fire protection 
8. Primary structure passive fire protection 
Electrical equipment 9. Hazardous area equipment 
Emergency shut down 10. Main engine room shut-down systems 
Vessel Stability 11. Ballast Tank level monitoring and control 
12.  Ballast Pump Room Flood alarms  
13.  Bilge alarm system 
14.  Watertight door indication and control system 
Vessel Position Keeping  15.  Mooring system 
16.  Towing system 
Diving spread 17.  Diving Bell life support systems 
18.  Diving bell lifting equipment and systems 
Escape and evacuation 19. Temporary refuge 
20. Alternative muster stations 
21.  Protected escape routes 
22.  Protected embarkation areas 
23.  TEMPSCs 
24.  Life rafts 
25.  Escape to sea arrangements 
26.  Evacuation personal equipment (Immersion suits & life vests) 
27.  Protective equipment (Breathing apparatus escape sets and PPE for 
fire-fighting team) 
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Ventilation equipment 28.  Temporary refuge HVAC system 
29.  Process control room HVAC  
30.  Accommodation HVAC 
 Well intervention equipment 31.  To be assessed prior to well intervention operations 
 
5.4.4 Following the identification of the SECEs, the performance standards for each of the SECE systems 
was created under four main parameters: 
 
 functionality 
 availability/reliability 
 survivability 
 
The performance standards are recorded in the Production Princess Major Accident Hazards Register, 
which also includes the scope and frequency of the verification inspections of those elements.  
 
5.4.5 Apart from the Vessel Position Keeping SECEs (which we consider are included within the ABS class 
survey inspections), all other verification activity is carried out by our corporate Verification Department 
based in Aberdeen.  The principles applied in selecting the personnel to carry out work to deliver the 
Production Princess verification scheme were based on the level of technical expertise, knowledge and 
experience available, and this selection process is covered by our corporate audits to ensure the correct 
level of competence is available to undertake verification activity. 
5.4.6 Reporting is carried out by exemption and any findings, including non-compliances, are recorded and 
outstanding recommendations or deficiencies documented on the appropriate form and forwarded to the 
Production Princess OIM for action. In addition, all such recommendations are reviewed and discussed by 
the senior corporate management with responsibility for this FPSO, in conjunction with the results of Class 
surveys undertaken by ABS, and appropriate action taken. 
 
5.4.7 The verification scheme, which forms an integral part of the management system, is subject to 
continuous monitoring and review throughout the Production Princess’ life, and should any deficiencies be 
identified the scope and frequency of the SECE testing and examinations will be amended accordingly.  
 
5.4.8 The verification arrangements described in this RoMH are restricted to the Production Princess’ 
permanent equipment and systems.  If any safety or environmentally critical equipment is brought on-
board the Production Princess by a third party or sub-contractor equipment, for instance during a 
combined operation or during modification /maintenance projects, it will be included in the verification 
scheme. 
  
  
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
  
 
doi:10.2760/608404 
ISBN 978-92-79-70670-7 
K
J-N
A
-2
8
6
9
3
-EN
-N
 
